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Chapter One 
Introduction 
 
1.1. El Lemby and Heen Maysara: Challenging Middle Class Normativity 
 
In 2002, the actor Mohamed Saad (1965- present) starred in a movie called ‘El 
Lemby’. He presented a caricaturist profile of a poor popular quarter dweller who cannot 
find appropriate work to earn his living and goes through many failing attempts to 
overcome his troubled situation. The film was the biggest box-office of the year and 
continued to be shown in movie theatres for seventeen consecutive weeks accumulating 
unprecedented revenues of twenty two million Egyptian pounds1. In 2004, a sequel of the 
movie was released (‘Elly Baly Balak’) and earned similar success (eighteen million 
pounds in twenty four weeks)2. Saad became the top-rated Egyptian superstar of his time 
and his surprising success rendered the character of the popular quarter dweller an 
extremely attractive one for other actors. Following El Lemby, many films about people 
living in informal urban expansions that surround and infiltrate the Egyptian capital 
emerged. With a prominent sarcastic style, the series of movies treating dramatic stories 
occurring in ashwaiyyat3 became a recurrent element of the Egyptian cinema market4
El Lemby (part 1) was however aggressively criticized in official and independent 
media discourses in Egypt. Except for few supportive critics, the film was perceived as a 
low-rank fragmented plot that distorts the reality of the poor dwelling in ashwaiyy 
. El 
Lemby and the rest of the popular heroes were generously received by the audience that 
imitated their manners and repeated their cynical comments. 
                                                     
1 . Hammond, Andrew 2007. Popular Culture in the Arab World: Arts, Politics and the Media. Cairo: 
American University Press in Cairo. Pp. 137- 158. 
2 . www.Egyfilm.com (Egyptian database of Arab films), November 2008. 
3 . Ashwaiyyat, the plural for ashwaiyya (literally meaning ‘half- hazard’) is the term used in public to refer 
to the informal housing communities that emerged in the seventies as urban expansions of Cairo and 
continued to infiltrate the Egyptian capital until now (Bayat and Denis, 2000). The word bears connotations 
of poverty, disorganization and vulgarity of the dwellers as the imagery permeates public discourse. It is 
usually used to stress the distinction between civic quarters for the middle and upper classes and haphazard 
quarters for the poor and marginalized classes.   
4 . Starting in 2002, Egyptian cinema presented around twenty six movies depicting lives in ashwaiyyat and 
narrating the stories of heroes dwelling in them. Scriptwriters like Belal Fadl, Nasser Abd Al Rahman and 
Ahmed El Beih wrote the majority of these films like ‘Saye’e Bahr’ (2002) , ‘El Lemby’ (2002) and ‘Elly 
Baly Balak’ (2003),  ‘Haha We Tofaha’ (2005), ‘Heya Fawda’ and ‘Heen Maysara’ 2007, ‘Bolteya Al 
Ayma’ (2008). 
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quarters by portraying them as ignorant and incoherent subjects. The discrepancy 
between the film revenues and the harsh criticism in TV programs and newspapers was 
quiet obvious, yet, confusing.  
In 2007, ‘Heen Maysara’  (Whenever it’s possible), a movie written by Nasser 
Abd Al Rahman (1960- present) and directed by Khaled Youssef 5
This tragic representation raised even more criticism. The film tackled sensitive 
issues about how these quarters function, the nature of sexual relations therein, and how 
their inhabitants relate to the police and other state officials. Youssef presented a 
pessimistic representation where a horrific moral decomposition and an obvious 
corruption and impunity were the basic rule. This image that seemed to be beyond the 
expectations of the majority of cinema audience in Egypt ignited a harsh criticism, to the 
extent that members of the Egyptian parliament and Al-Azhar professors discussed 
banning the film
 (1965- present) 
reflected on the miserable reality of ashwaiyyat. Abd Al Rahman scrutinized the reality 
survived in a poor neighborhood, although he did not insist on presenting the mannerisms 
and language of its dwellers as a comic material, though his script included characters 
that were very similar (in the broad lines and style) to El Lemby. These characters’ 
language and sarcasm sounded bitterer and not laughable, especially when placed in the 
dramatic context of the movie.  
6
In many critical readings of Heen Maysara the characters stimulated fear and 
sadness rather than laughter. Samir Farid, the well-known cinema critic argued: “the 
middle and upper middle class viewers for the first time watched a touching drama about 
Ashwaiyyat and witnessed how the reality of these people is unbelievably cruel and 
inhumane”
. 
7
                                                     
5 . An Egyptian director known for his socialist inclinations. Some of his films depict the social reality of 
the poor and marginalized strata in contemporary Egyptian society. 
6.http://www.aksalser.com/?page=view_news&id=24793128973a465f1930eed64f4ed57b&ar=810200570. 
November 2008. 
7 . Al Ryad newspaper. December 2007. 
. Youssef and Abd Al Rahman courageously presented prostitution, incest, 
promiscuity, and rape as daily patterns of sexual relations in ashwaiyyat. They tried to 
clarify the suffocating economic and social conditions behind these comportments and 
how those people were obliged to accept humiliation and authorize debauchery for 
reasons related to their class position and their economic situation. 
11 
 
Moreover, one of the radical steps that Heen Maysara’s producers took was their 
conscious attempt to confront the audience with the nature of the relationship between the 
characters of the film (or ashwaiyyat residents) and the Egyptian security apparatus. The 
film discussed Baltaga (thuggery) in ashwaiyyat as an essential behavior reinforced and 
encouraged by state officers. The film detailed how corrupt relations involved policemen, 
criminals and popular quarters’ thugs in a network that structured daily life in Egypt at 
large. Youssef in Heen Maysara exposed the interdependency between state personnel 
and ashwaiyyat dwellers, demonstrating how they share the public space according to 
hierarchical power relations. This representation of power relations between the 
inhabitants of ashwaiyyat, the state and the middle and upper classes implicitly accused 
the more powerful (state as well as upper and middle classes) of perpetuating the 
humiliation and poverty of the disenfranchised. Youssef contended:  
“Heen Maysara underpins the class discriminatory bases of such interdependency 
and the nature of exploitation of those people by turning them into thugs and 
criminals. The criminality in this case is deployed to empower the corrupt rulers 
and instate the rule of impunity and chaos.”8
In this research, I examine the connections between such representations in 
contemporary Egyptian cinema and the sociopolitical reality which they document and of 
which they are part during 2002-2008. I focus on this time frame because of the 
expanding production of Egyptian films depicting ashwaiyyat and their dwellers. I argue 
that the systematic and repetitive focus on ashwaiyyat residents symbolizes an equivalent 
presence and influence of ashwaiyyat on the public sphere. In other words, the depictions 
in the films are the norm, rather than an anomaly. Representation in fiction, as Achille 
Mbembe
 
 
 
1.2. Research Concerns and Questions 
 
9
                                                     
8 . Interview with Khaled Youssef. Ehna magazine (April 2009). 
9 . Mbembe, Achille. 2001. “The Thing and Its Doubles” In On the Postcolony. Berkeley: University of 
California Press. Pp. 159- 160. 
 claims, is part of the construction of “the normal” and thus endowed with 
creating a “true narrative.” Mbembe assumes that a true narrative is “the narrative that 
possesses an ability to get believed as true because it rests on a system of belief and 
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acquires a mimetic and allegorical relation to the reality in addition to the familiarity and 
plausibility between the narrative and the everyday experience.”10
In the 1980s and 1990s ashwaiyyat inhabitants, as Salwa Ismail argues, were 
systematically removed and excluded from the prevalent social discourses. According to 
Ismail, they were usually talked about as a “potential threat to the middle class either as 
religious extremists or criminal thugs.”
  
11 In the same vein, the state was represented as 
the guardian of the people and the nation working hard to eliminate the threat of 
ashwaiyyat from the public domain, and symbolically denying their presence in public 
discourse, particularly in official media12
In my ethnography, I contend that in the films the representation of vulgarity, 
authorized violence, and criminality as traits confined to ashwayiyat appealed to a fair 
number of middle class audience.
. The increased representation of ashwaiyyat in 
cinema, I argue, signifies the inevitability of including them in realistic cinematic 
productions. Given the shifts in power relations, violence and chaotic conditions that 
permeate life in almost all the quarters in Egypt, excluding ashwaiyyat was no longer a 
possibility. My thesis examines the conditions that made this shift possible as well as the 
effect of these productions and reactions thereto on the construction of social order in 
Egypt.  
13
                                                     
10 . Ibid.  P. 163. 
11. Ismail, Salwa 2006. Political Life in Cairo’s New Quarters. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press. 
12 . Ibid, 2006. 
13. ‘El Lemby’ was the biggest box- office hit in Arab cinema in 2002 and continued to be shown in 
theatres for seventeen weeks with unprecedented revenues of twenty two million Egyptian pounds 
(Egyfilm.com).   
 I further argue that such a tolerance may indicate a 
serious change in the ways violence and force are practiced in Egypt by both the state and 
its subjects. It also refers to a different perception of the law institution and the 
regulations that govern the public sphere and the social interaction in the period 2002-
2008. My argument in this respect is that the institutions entrusted and charged with the 
regulation of social interaction and the legitimate use of violence, have faced a drastic 
moral and structural collapse since the 1990s. This collapse, which hinders the 
performance of their roles, disseminates a generalized air of chaos. By the turn of the 21st 
century these conditions found articulation in cinema and other media productions. 
13 
 
The ruling regime (that took over since the military coup 1952) has undergone 
changes in its conception and its force deployment. Discourses perpetuated by ruling 
elites justify their repressive practices and legitimize the use of violence against its 
national subjects. This “police project of the government,”14
Michel- Rolph Trouillot
 as Ismail refers to it, 
assumes the survival and security of state agents and allies as its first priority. Security, in 
this sense, is guaranteed by attacking freedom of expression and democratic processes of 
succession to and holding of power. However, guaranteeing “security” has not been 
always an easy task. Preserving despotic rule in Egypt for six successive decades required 
recourse to conventional and unconventional mechanisms of control and techniques of 
governance. 
15
Additionally, I unpack such transformations in power and violence by examining 
how they are depicted in the films, particularly in the way the state is represented in “El 
Lemby” and “Heen Maysar,a” and how state agents practice violence and deploy power 
viz. a viz. subordinated and marginalized subjects. In my analysis of media productions, I 
explore thus how El Lemby and Heen Maysara delve into the magnitude and effects of 
governance on people smashed by the relentless censorship of a coercive security 
apparatus. The people of ashwaiyyat as portrayed in the two movies are part and parcel of 
an entire social structure shaped by despotic rule and its concomitant effect of 
disorganization, violence and chaos. However, the two films stress the confinement of 
 distinguishes between a conventional dictatorship and 
an unconventional dictatorship that “deploys different mechanisms to bring its abuse of 
power to unprecedented limits.” Focusing on the way the Duvaliers in Haiti solidified 
their dictatorship 1957-1964, Trouillot identifies a set of processes that induced a 
qualitative change in the nature of Duvaliers’ authoritarianism. In my thesis, I build on 
his analysis in an attempt to examine transformations in state mechanisms in Egypt in the 
2000s. To demonstrate such shifts in the nature of governance and violence, I rely on 
other studies, reports of international organizations and newspapers accounts which 
document these aggressive transformations. 
                                                     
14 . Ismail, Salwa 2006. Political Life in Cairo’s New Quarters. University of Minnesota Press. Pp. 63- 67. 
15 . Trouillot, Michel- Rolph. 1990. “State against Nation” In Haiti: State against Nation, the Origins and 
Legacy of Duvalierism. New York: Monthly Review Press. Pp. 163- 185. 
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this disorganization to ashwaiyyat and thus reproduce the dominant discourses about 
ashwaiyyat’s potential threat to the established upper and middle classes. Such 
representations, I argue, produce the effect of a subconscious neutralization of the actual 
and daily violence practiced by the state against all its subjects regardless of their class 
positions. Ultimately, such productions legitimize ‘class racism’ and societal aggression 
against ashwaiyyat as an acceptable and normative reaction, displacing thuggery and 
criminality as inherent exclusively in ashwaiyyat.  
 
1.3. Research Question: Is Chaos Reducible to the Imaginary Boundaries of 
Ashwaiyyat? 
 
In this research project, I aim at presenting a cultural study that analyzes the 
phenomena of Egyptian commercial films which depicted ashwaiyyat and their dwellers 
as their main theme (2000- present), a focus that constitutes a remarkable subversion of 
the cinematic tradition in Egypt. With a special focus on two films “El Lemby” 2002 and 
“Heen Maysara” 2007, my research illuminates the sociopolitical context that influences 
the cinematic representation of the poor classes on the big screen. I argue that a 
substantial transformation in cinematic representation was influenced by the broader 
sociopolitical and economic context. Principally, I assess middle class sensibilities about 
the relation between the ruling elite, the state and its subjects as represented in the films. 
The focus on representing the poor and marginalized subjects who dwell in slum areas in 
the late media productions is underpinned, in my opinion, by a change in the way the 
Egyptian state produces its image as the guardian of the masses, legitimately using 
violence toward all undesirable and threatening elements of society.  
Such a change can be attributed to an unprecedented tension in the state/citizen 
relationship in contemporary Egypt under the rule of Mubarak (1981- present). This 
relation is emphasized in the films by elaborating on the themes of social exclusion, 
societal (unauthorized) violence and the public brutalization of subjects by Egyptian state 
representatives. This thesis is questioning whether violence and social exclusion are 
confined to the boundaries of poor and informal localities or rather they represent 
experiences that extend way beyond the geographies of ashwaiyyat.  
15 
 
I chose to focus ethnographically on the middle class’ reactions to the films. 
Given the theoretical limitations of a definitive definition and delineation of middle class 
in Egypt particularly at present, a theme I discuss later, my selection of interviewees 
included a diversified group of people that share and position themselves within the 
public sphere as “middle class” claiming a variety of class markers ranging from cultural 
background, education, income, profession and location. This choice is based on two 
fundamental assumptions. First, the Egyptian middle class has been part and parcel of all 
the dominant social discourses including cinema (particularly those produced by the 
postcolonial Egyptian state) that prevailed after the military coup in 1952. In such 
discourses the middle classes occupied the central role as the beholders as well as the 
main agents of modernization of the Egyptian nation16
In my analysis I map out two principal dimensions. First, how these 
representations capitalize on exposing the state/subjects relationship where violence and 
vulgarity are symptoms of the longevity of a postcolonial despotic system. Second, how 
the process of representation contributes to the reproduction and the perpetuation of 
inequitable class conditions in Egypt that ultimately reinforce the polarization of classes 
into an extravagantly rich class and an intolerably poor one. In this respect, my study 
. The hegemony of these social 
discourses naturalized in the social imaginary the moralities, sensibilities and modes of 
practice of the middle class as the most appropriate and accepted/aspired to social 
comportment.  
Second, this thesis offers a re-reading of the films depicting ashwaiyyat in relation 
to media discourses about the shrinkage of the middle class as a result of the 
implementation of neoliberal programs in Egypt starting from the 1990s. My research is 
principally concerned with how representations in media productions are both influential 
in the formulation of hegemonic public discourses and reflective of prevailing public 
debates. My aim is to delineate the complex relationship between the representation of 
ashwaiyyat inhabitants in the contemporary Egyptian commercial cinema and the 
sociopolitical reality that perpetuates their exclusion and further destruction.  
                                                     
16 . Younis, Sherif. (2005). Al Zahf al-Mouqads: Mothaharat al-Tanahyi wa Tashakoul ‘Abadat Nasser 
(The Sacred March: the Abdication Demonstrations and the Formulation of Nasser’s Worship). Cairo: Dar 
Merit.  
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attempts to challenge the falsified perception of ashwaiyyat as the dwellings of 
marginalized groups of poor, vulgar and ignorant people who pursue their lives in a 
distant space disconnected from the rest of the refined areas of Cairo. In this respect, I 
intend to map out a blurring of boundaries between the middle and lower class ethos and 
practices in the actual contemporary context.  
It is noticeable in the last decade that Egyptian cinema repetitively portrayed non-
middle class heroes who inhabit ashwaiyyat.17 The heroes were shown as extremely poor 
and behaving in a vulgar manner that was considered striking yet appealing to the 
majority of the audience of movie theaters.18
While attempting to bridge the gap between description and fieldwork in media 
studies,
 My aim while writing the ethnography of 
the two films “El Lemby” and “Heen Maysara” is to provide a thick description of the 
films and unpack how members of the middle class relate to the chaotic and disorganized 
worlds exposed to them.  
19
 
 I will demonstrate how the politics of representation implied in the two films 
(as ethnographic sites) reproduce the harsh distinctions prevailing in the social imaginary 
about the middle and lower classes. Moreover, I will decipher how these films introduce 
the notions of violence and impunity both as a systematized state comportment and an 
internalized individual mode of behavior across classes.     
  
 
 
 
 
                                                     
17 . Hammond, Andrew 2007. Popular Culture in the Arab World: Arts, Politics and the Media. Cairo: 
American University Press in Cairo. Pp. 137-158. 
18 . Different newspapers criticized “El Lemby” as part of the revival of the Egyptian cinema with ‘low- 
culture’ blockbuster comedies but that nevertheless had  tapped into a desire among the burgeoning 
younger generation for new faces and films that deal with the realities of today’s youth (Hammond 2007: 
139). 
19 . See for instance Patrick D. Murphy and Marwan M. Kraidy (2003). “Towards an Ethnographic 
Approach to Global Media Studies” in Patrick D. Murphy and Marwan M. Kraidy (eds). Global Media 
Studies: Ethnographic Perspectives. Routledge Taylor 61 Francis Grnup NEW YORK AND LONDON. 
P.5- 19. 
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Chapter Two 
Overview of Literature and Methodological Approach 
 2.1. Introduction 
In this dissertation, I address contemporary Egyptian film productions during 
2002-2008. I aspire to write an ethnography of the two films ‘Heen Maysara’ (2007) and 
‘El Lemby’ (2002) by situating them first within the broad sociopolitical context of 
Egypt, and second, by focusing on readings by members of the middle classes of the two 
films. This endeavor is not based on a reception study of the entire middle class. Rather, I 
provide an ethnographic reading of the films relying on interviews with viewers and 
producers, content analysis of discourses published in newspapers and magazines 
covering the period 2002-2008, in addition to an analysis of the two films. My aim is to 
assess middle class sensibilities and discourses about ashwayiyat and their dwellers. I 
consider the two films as my principal ethnographic sites which offer an interpretation of 
ashwaiyyat and the sociopolitical relations in Egypt that I examine in relation to analyses 
of the time regarding the same theme. I consider the sociopolitical context of Egypt – 
particularly the presence of the ruling political regime in the everyday life of its citizens – 
as cornerstone in this research. Therefore, I examine how the films reflect on 
state/citizens relationship in ashwaiyyat spaces. I juxtapose such a representation in 
relation to how the middle class participants in my research reacted to it. My essential 
argument in this respect is that a similar relation of violence, chaos and precariousness 
already prevails between the state and its middle class subjects; however, members of the 
middle class deny such a relationship and displace it onto the dwellers of ashwaiyyat. 
  My argument is premised on and informed by theoretical frameworks that situate 
Egypt within postcolonial Africa. This classification is organically important to my 
research for two reasons. First, the ruling Egyptian regime shares essential criteria of the 
postcolonial regimes and adopts similar perception of power and authoritarianism as 
described in the analyses of postcolonial scholars in and about Africa, particularly with 
regard to state/citizen relationships. Second, I contend that the middle class shares a 
18 
 
position analogous to that of the lower classes to the state, given the despotic nature of 
governance that prevails. Both groups (i.e. middle and lower classes) are subjected to 
chaotic behavior instated and perpetuated by the state machinery, compounded by a rule 
of impunity on part of state functionaries and their allies. My argument is informed by the 
works of Achille Mbmbe in Cameroon20 and Johannes Fabian in Congo21
My analysis attempts thus to synthesize two bodies of literature. The first is 
concerned with processes of representation, especially in mass media, and its integral role 
in producing and reproducing knowledge about social reality. The second is the 
conception of state formation and the techniques of its power and control on the everyday 
practice of its subjects. There I delineate the limitations of the frameworks classifying the 
Egyptian state as a Middle Eastern polity versus the frameworks I am using to understand 
the contemporary Egyptian state as a postcolonial formation in Africa. I argue in this 
thesis that the founding essences of the state legacy in Egypt imply dimensions that were 
better articulated in the academic discourse about the postcolonial African states and 
were ignored by Middle East theorists.  
, who produced 
ethnographic accounts of public culture and media productions while detailing the 
coloniality of power in postcolonial formations, the chaotic nature of rule, and the erosion 
of legal recourse and rule of law.  
 
2.2. Representations as ‘Regimes of Truth’ 
Introduction 
 
  In this reading of two media productions as representations of the contemporary 
social reality in Egypt, my analysis is informed by a conception of representation as a 
process that cannot be simply considered as permutations that re-interpret and reproduce 
practices and ideas available in social institutions and cultural discourses. In contrast, 
representation contributes to the production of knowledge and the construction of new 
discourses about social reality. In other words, representation in artistic production 
                                                     
20 . Mbembe, Achille. 2001. On the Postcolony. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
21 . Fabian, Johannes. 1998.  Moments of Freedom: Anthropology and Popular Culture. Charlottesville: 
University Press of Virginia. 
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possesses an agency in formulating knowledge about certain practices and structuring the 
social response and activities accordingly. Pierre Bourdieu elaborates on this dialectical 
process of production and reception of social knowledge through representation: 
“… and in particular all knowledge of the social world, is an act of construction 
implementing schemes of thought and expression, and that between conditions of 
existence and practices or representations there intervenes the structuring activity 
of the agents, who, far from reacting mechanically to mechanical stimulations, 
respond to the invitations or threats of a world whose meaning they have helped 
to produce”22
“Each society has its regimes of truth, its ‘general politics’ of truth: that is, the 
types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true, the mechanisms 
and instances which enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the means 
by which each one is sanctioned; the techniques and procedures accorded value in 
the acquisition of truth; the status of those who are charged with saying what 
counts as true”
 
 
Building on this idea, I will focus on the theoretical frameworks highlighting the 
cultural and social backgrounds that nurture and inspire the actual practice and create an 
arena of representation to confer meaning on such practices. The relation between 
practices and representations cannot be studied separately from their socio- cultural 
context, language and discourse, social codes of behavior and power relations. In this 
respect, I find Michel Foucault’s identification of media images and representations as 
‘regimes of truth’ crucial: 
23
Social practice cannot be regarded as a closed circle of actions that possess an 
autonomous will and influence. Theorists like Stuart Hall view representation as the 
process that mediates the transition of social practice from the direct and limited space of 
occurrence to the broad universe of meanings and interpretations. It comprises a set of 
tools and vehicles that produce meaning and formulate cultural discourses, which in turn 
produce and influence practice
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. Stuart Hall defines representation as follows:, 
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“Representation is an essential part of the process by which meaning is produced and 
exchanged between members of a culture. It involves the use of language, signs and 
images which stand for or represent things”25
“At the heart of the meaning process in culture, then, are two related systems of 
representation. The first enables us to give meaning to the world by constructing a 
set of correspondences or a chain of equivalences between things- people, objects, 
events, abstract ideas, etc. - and our system of concepts, our conceptual maps. The 
second depends on constructing a set of correspondences between our conceptual 
map and a set of signs, arranged or organized into various languages which stand 
for or represent those concepts. The relation between ‘things’, concepts and signs 
lies at the heart of the production of meaning in language. The process which 
links these three elements together is what we call representation”
. He further stresses that there are two 
systems of representation. The first is a system by which all sorts of objects, people and 
events are correlated with a set of concepts or mental representations without which we 
cannot interpret the world meaningfully. This system operates mainly on a mental level 
and is not dependent on individual concepts, but on different ways of organizing, 
clustering, arranging and classifying concepts and of establishing complex relations 
between them. This system is closely related to the perception of culture as a constitutive 
process that implies a set of practices ingrained in a collective matrix of concepts and 
interpretations.  
The second system of representation in Hall’s definition is language.  Language, 
in his words, is not confined to words or phrases, but it is all the signs (visual, auditory, 
facial expressions, movements, and images) that translate sets of relations dwelling in the 
thought process into expressive meanings and ways of communication that people share. 
It is the practical element of representation that transforms objects in our minds into 
communicable experiences and practices which shape and affect identity. Hall explains 
the interrelation between these two systems of representation as follows:  
26
In my ethnography, I explored how media productions get influenced while 
building the characters, the dialogue and the dramatic sequence by prevalent social 
structures and discourses. Analyzing the debates around both movies, I found Hall’s 
systems of representations (meaning and language) analytically useful in decoding the 
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signs inscribed in the drama from different positions of reception. For example, I found 
the receptive audience in my middle class sample of critics and viewers greatly 
influenced by the prevalent discourses about ashwaiyyat in the official media. In other 
instances, I identified reactions that critically engaged with these dominant structures and 
provided an unconventional reading of the drama in the movies. I also relied on the 
literature of cultural studies that tackled the relation between the audience and media 
productions, particularly British cultural studies and authors like John Fiske, Michelle 
Byers and Diana Fuss to interpret these diversified positions of interpretation. In their 
works, the former authors stress the active engagement of the audience in decoding the 
media representation. Yet, they affirm that such engagement happens in the very 
discursive patterns where the viewer and the text intersect dialectically all through the 
process of reception. 
 
2.2.1. Viewers and Representations: Reading the Relationship? 
 
 In my thesis I analyze contemporary media productions in relation to the 
sociopolitical context to understand the dialectical relationship between them. I argue that 
the receptive audience is definitively part of this context/social reality and the agent 
through which the social practices and their representation keep feeding each other. I 
focus on media productions and analyze the positionality of the viewers while they 
consume mass media. Elizabeth Seymour depicts how the viewers relate to the ‘regimes 
of truth’ embedded in the media production texts:  
“For example, some of these ‘regimes of truth’ within a given text would include 
the way that characters are created and portrayed, the moral issues that are raised 
within the storyline, the logic and sense of plausibility of the storyline and 
characters, and the social messages and critiques that are presented to the 
viewer”27
 
 
Focusing on these dimensions while analyzing the reactions of a diversified 
middle class sample of viewers of Heen Maysara and El Lemby, I examine how the 
relation of the viewers to media representations conveys projections on their own lives 
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and the social world. Despite their belief that representations are not identical to reality, 
viewers engage with the discourses and connotations implied in the movies believing that 
these narratives negotiate their social reality and reproduce a ‘truthful’ statement about it.  
 Theorists of British cultural studies like Fiske28 and Hall29 essentialized the active 
engagement of the audience in encoding and decoding the message of the dramatic texts 
in the process of representation. They argue that it is impossible to separate messages 
from meanings, and hence re- situated ‘audience’ as a central focus of analysis in cultural 
studies. They claim that mass media provides audiences with ways of seeing and 
interpreting their world, helping them ultimately to shape their very existence and 
participation in society30. However, there are no easy answers for the questions about the 
mechanisms through which viewers’ mental structures operate in relation to the media 
representations. Positionality implies complex categories; gender, class, space, 
profession, self image and personal histories. Byers assumes that a certain amount of 
flexibility allows diversified reactions of rejection or acceptance: “I believe that the 
spectators exist in a relationship to the texts they view that is neither entirely open or 
entirely closed. Rather, the relationship between spectator and text is always situational, 
contingent and shifting”31
I presume that the viewers approach media representations through three main 
trajectories that complement each other. The first is the reflective or mimetic approach 
which postulates that meaning is thought to lie in the object, person, idea or event in the 
real world. Representation, in this sense, functions like a mirror, to reflect the true 
meaning as it already exists in the world
.   
32
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. The reflective approach s influenced by the 
Marxist and Frankfurt school theorists, who stipulate that the message carried by media 
productions is the key unit of cultural meaning, which reflects society’s dominant 
23 
 
ideologies and that is delivered directly to the popular consciousness33. Theodor Adorno 
postulates that capitalism is ‘an objective totality of social relations’ where a chain of 
intermediary social convictions intervene indirectly to produce the cultural 
superstructure34
 “… is constructed as the generative formula which makes it possible to account 
both for the classifiable practices and products and for the judgments, themselves 
classified, which make these practices and works into a system of distinctive 
signs”
. He alleges that the direct relation between the base and the 
superstructure that produces mass media productions only exists through complex 
relations where a set of social discourses are expressed. Art works, in this sense, are 
expected to reflect the nature of this totality of social relations not a single organ of it like 
a certain class for example.  
The second approach is the intentional approach that presumes that it is the 
speaker, the author, who imposes his or her unique meaning on the world through 
language and that words mean what the author intends they should mean. However, the 
intentional approach is not enough to understand language and meaning as constantly 
related to their media of production and context of reception. This approach denies the 
possibility for the reception process to produce meaning. Based on my research, I argue 
that the production of meaning cannot be simplified and reduced to a single author. On 
contrary it is a complex process that includes several members sharing this 
communicative experience. The process of reception decodes the messages of the artistic 
productions from a certain position. According to Bourdieu, class position provides 
recipients of art with the codes of interpretation suitable to their inherited dispositions or 
‘habitus’. Bourdieu argues habitus: 
35
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 In this sense, the process of reception is part of the social construction and reproduction 
of class distinctions where the natural taste for artistic productions is previously 
appropriated according to class position.  
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  The third approach, the constructive approach, perceives representation from a 
constructionist position of analysis and asserts that meaning is not naturally existent, it is 
constructed. Using the representational systems identified by Hall, meaning is mobilized 
from its material world to a symbolic world of concepts and signs. Through the linguistic 
system, symbolic practices and processes operate to convey meaning to the material 
world and help social actors to communicate about that world meaningfully to others36
 “Language sets up an arbitrary relation between signifiers of its own choosing on 
one hand, and signifieds of its own choosing on the other. Not only does each 
language produce a different set of signifiers, articulating and dividing the 
continuum of sound (or writing or drawing or photography) in a distinctive way; 
each language produces a different set of signifieds; it has a distinctive and thus 
arbitrary way of organizing the world into concepts and categories”
. 
The works of the Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure and Roland Barthes further 
investigated how these systems of representation operate and incarnate a dense body of 
meanings and connotations for the viewers to encode and decode. 
De Saussure distinguished between two levels of operation of language as a 
system of signs, and divided the sign into two elements. The first is the signifier which is 
the ‘form’ or the actual practice that signifies (the image, the actual word, photo...). The 
second element is ‘the signified’ which is the idea or concept with which the form is 
associated. Both elements are essential in the production of meaning but marking the 
difference between them is crucial to allow for analysis that does not assume fixed 
meanings, rather open representation to the constant play or slippage of meaning. 
Jonathan Culler elaborates on Saussure’s differentiation arguing: 
37
Asserting this arbitrariness, Culler emphasizes that there is no universal true 
meaning as the sign is constantly subjected to the history and the particular moment 
where the signifier and a certain signified combine and make meaning, i.e. it is always 
contingent shaped by the historical process
. 
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. By emphasizing that meaning is changeable 
and contextual, interpretation becomes the focal point of analysis viewing it as the active 
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process by which meaning is given and taken. Hall elaborates: “Every signifier given or 
encoded with meaning has to be meaningfully interpreted or decoded by the receiver.”39
 “This second, wider meaning is no longer a descriptive level of obvious 
interpretation. This second level of significance is more general, global and 
diffuse. It deals with fragments of an ideology… These signifieds have a very 
close communication with culture, knowledge, history and it is through them, so 
to speak, that the environmental world (of the culture) invades the system (of 
representation).”
  
Roland Barthes further develops the notion of ‘sign’ and links it to broader 
cultural thematics and concepts. He differentiates between a descriptive level 
‘denotation’ of the material or the actual practice and a wider level ‘connotation’ where 
practice is decoded by connecting it to ‘wider realms of social ideology’. Barthes states: 
40
 This connection that Barthes establishes by identifying connotation liberates the 
definitions of meaning and representation from language as a closed static system. 
Representation thus is viewed as a source of production of social knowledge, “a more 
open system, connected in more intimate ways with social practices and questions of 
power.”
 
 
41
 
 In the coming section, I will decipher the relation between media 
representations as agents in the formulation of social discourses and relations of power.  
2. 2. 2. The Microphysics of Power and State Representation 
 
One of the essential aspects of this research is analyzing the symbolic power that 
the media productions possess and the extent to which representations participate in the 
formulation of dominant discourses and the shaping of the social imaginary. The question 
of power, as deployed in my research, on the one hand refers to the nation state and to the 
power relations prevalent in the sociopolitical domain which influence the social 
practices and strategies of survival and/or resistance against the control of that state. I 
will elaborate in the coming paragraphs on the mechanisms through which the construct 
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of the state operates in the everyday life. I contend that media representations in Heen 
Maysara and El Lemby portrayed these mechanisms and micro-processes and provided a 
ground to engage critically with the issue of the powerful presence of the Egyptian state 
in the everyday life of its citizens. A large segment of the feedback I collected about the 
films related to the negotiation of the state imagery in the contemporary times and 
perceived the chaotic patterns of performance and expression in both films as a 
reproduction of the grotesque in and of state performance.    
 Michel Foucault argues that the techniques of governmentality are maximally 
invested in state institutions42. Yet, Foucault challenges the traditional postulates about 
power as a vertical axis radiating in a single direction from top to bottom and coming 
from a specific source (the sovereign, the state, the ruling class, etc…), he states: ”Power 
does not function in the form of a chain- it circulates. It is never monopolized by one 
centre. It is deployed and exercised through a net- like organization”43
“Power relations permeate all levels of social existence and are therefore to be 
found operating at every site of social life- in the private spheres of the family and 
sexuality as much as in the public spheres of politics, the economy and the law”
. Foucault also 
presumes that we are all caught in these networks, oppressors and oppressed:  
44
“Power is dispersed and in a sense has no center. It is inscribed in the social 
relations and operates by means of techniques and instruments that penetrate the 
social body. In analytical terms, the focus on microprocesses of power is designed 
to crystallize the dispersion and penetration mechanisms of power into the nooks 
and crannies of the social body”
.  
 
Mitchell Dean, relying on Foucault’s perspective, elaborates on the mechanism by 
which the state diffuses its power into the social body: 
45
Through these micro-processes, the state deploys its techniques of governance to achieve 
control and instate its concrete presence in the social consciousness. Foucault maps out 
how power relations operate within the framework of minor practices exercised by larger 
structures like the state or the dominant classes. He claims that there are localized 
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circuits, tactics, mechanisms and effects through which power circulates- what Foucault 
calls the ‘meticulous rituals’ or the ‘microphysics’ of power46
In Foucault’s theoretical framework practices are organized and acquire meanings 
within respective discourses. Later, the practices inscribed in this discourse become 
objects of knowledge. Foucault identified six elements included in the process of 
construction of discourses around a certain topic: First, statements that provide 
knowledge about this topic. Second, rules that prescribe certain ways of talking and 
govern what is ‘sayable’ or ‘thinkable’ about this topic. Third, subjects that personify the 
discourse (for example, the madman in discourse about madness). Fourth, the way by 
which this knowledge about that topic acquires authority and a sense of embodying the 
truth. Fifth, the practice within institutions for dealing with the subjects whose conduct is 
regulated and organized according to this knowledge (e.g. punishment regimes for the 
guilty). Sixth, acknowledgement that a different discourse or episteme will arise at a 
different historical moment opening up a new ‘discursive formation’
.  
The lower levels of social practices, for Foucault, should not be regarded as 
simple projections of the central power, but as the discursive practices produced in a 
certain historical and cultural context. The interpretation of these practices takes into 
consideration the historicity and the discourses that prevailed at their time of occurrence.  
47. These elements 
provide us with a complex conception of knowledge as inextricably enmeshed in 
dominant power relations because knowledge is a technique in the regulation of social 
conduct and the imaginary that informs it. Foucault foregrounded the relation between 
discourse, knowledge and power as a fundamental nexus to understand processes of 
representation. His approach rescued representation from the clutches of a purely formal 
theory and gave it a historical, practical and worldly context of operation, as Hall 
depicts48
 
. 
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2. 3. Public Culture and the Choice of Ethnography 
 
Introduction 
“Hypertextuality of popular culture implicates what is 
conventionally known as high culture, as well as the officially 
(and academically) despised categories of non- metropolitan 
low culture. This does not, however, mean that the mad 
hypertextuality of popular culture is without structure”49
“Another reason for the lack of attention that the mass media has received in 
anthropology is the broader bias in academia against those aspects of culture 
considered lowbrow. Within this broader cultural debate, art, literature and 
entertainment are often divided into high and low forms, with most televisual 
programming falling under the latter category. Folklore, most art, some music, 
most theatre and some film are regarded as a part of high culture, and therefore 
worthy of our attention and academic interest. There is a long tradition of 
devaluing certain forms of art and entertainment in the Western culture.”
. 
 
It seems to me that one of the basic difficulties is trying to situate public culture 
(as a category of analysis) in the contemporary Egyptian context, given the polarized 
theoretical paradigm that dichotomizes high and low culture. Seymour analyzes how such 
a distinction impeded the growth of mass media productions as subject of studies in 
anthropology: 
50
 Seymour claims that this tradition started to fade out when Debra Spitulnik published her 
book Anthropology and mass media in 1993. However, the limited view of public culture 
in Africa as a ‘premodern’ creation that conveys a primitive and isolated particularity of 
the African societies still affects cultural studies of mass media. Armbrust
 
 
51 citing Talal 
Asad52
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 points out that anthropology has been more concerned with studying ‘non 
modern’ peoples, and so has historically rejected, as an object of study, those aspects of 
societies and cultures which are considered modern. This focus on the premodern in 
29 
 
anthropology has meant that orality is the main focus of analysis, while the written and 
the mediated have been neglected. This explains why anthropologists in a place such as 
Cairo have managed to do research on people’s everyday lives without mentioning the 
fact that these lives are highly mediated.  
In this thesis, I rely on an understanding of public culture as a socio- cultural 
construct that invokes a constellation of meanings and connotations derived from the 
collective social imaginary and the individual everyday interactions in particular 
sociopolitical context. This makes of public culture in Egypt an equivalent of ‘culture’ as 
a unitary construct if we traced an allegorical relation to Johannes Fabian’s view of 
popular culture in Africa:  
 “Popular culture is not an entity; the term stands for certain discursive strategies. 
Popular culture signals a discourse that raises issues of power, if only because it 
tends to contest what is being affirmed about culture. Although the approach 
sketched here denies ontological status to culture, this does not mean that culture 
and popular culture are merely analytical categories or heuristic devices. They are 
real enough as practices of inquiry and writing, addressed to real practices of 
living and embroiled in political relations and interests”53
  In his statement, Fabian challenges the pejorative approach that situates popular 
culture between locality and non-modernity on the one hand, and its victimization as 
being an indigent Westernized copy. He claims that popular culture is far more 
integrative and meaningful for the diverse functions and implications it holds. In his 
integrative approach to study popular culture in Africa, Fabian equated popular culture 
productions like painting, theatre, music to religion as discourses that make up a vast 
complex of thought, representations and performances. Fabian asks anthropologists to 
review the centrality of popular culture in the social reality of Africa and consequently 
reassess its categorical position in their theoretical frameworks. He thinks that reaching 
such a conviction will reposition the ethnographer towards his/ her subjects and free him/ 
her from the confining prejudices: “… To further our understanding of contemporary 
African culture by progressing from fixations on tribal traditions perishing under the 
. 
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onslaught of Westernization to appreciating the vital, often exuberant expressions modern 
Africans give to their experiences”54
  Mass media in contemporary Africa cannot be assessed and analyzed solely 
according to aesthetic or entertainment parameters. It is their power of expression and 
giving voice to the silenced subjects that distinguishes their position as an artistic work: 
“Not mere exposure to power and oppression, but transformation of experience into 
communicable expressions, is at the origin of popular culture as resistance to colonial and 
postcolonial domination”
.  
Informed by this understanding of popular culture, my research focuses on the 
media representations and metaphors in both films (Heen Maysara and El Lemby), as 
well as the social structures and power relations which shape the characters. The nexus of 
these two foci affords my analysis a rich subtext about social reality which I read against 
the background of larger context of Egypt. Unpacking the political and social 
connotations of a mainstream cultural production, as reflected in the two movies, offers 
me an angle to view the production and workings of a collective social imaginary and 
consciousness. Such an approach enables me to trace power relations and social 
hierarchy, venues of resistance, and the limitations of individual agency as constructed in 
the movies and the interpretations thereof.  
55
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. Building on this perspective, ethnographic fieldwork 
establishes the relation between the public culture experience and the historical moment 
of its occurrence. The notion of historicity, as deployed in my research, combines both 
the contextual particularity of the cultural practice in Egypt and the massive influence of 
Westernized modernization processes (particularly neoliberal programs) that influence 
social reality in the period 2002-2008. 
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2. 3. 1. Ethnography and Encompassing the Everyday 
 
“To approach anything remotely like a ‘native’ ability to understand how 
Egyptians deploy their common stock of imagery and personalities 
requires a familiarity with popular texts that is more like what Orientalists 
do with medieval texts- relating them to each other, comparing them to 
each other, comparing them with other textual traditions, juxtaposing 
them, classifying them- than like the anthropologist’s fantasy of spending 
a year with ‘informants’, ‘picking up the language in the field’, and 
relying on ‘theory’ to do the rest”56
The call for an ethnographic study of media productions emerged from the need 
to broaden the analyses of mass media phenomena from the encoding- decoding model of 
Stuart Hall
. 
 
57
“An enquiry into the audience should be an enquiry, not into a set of pre- 
constituted individuals or rigidly defined social groups, but into a set of daily 
practices and discourses within which the complex act of watching television is 
placed alongside others, and through which that complex act is itself 
constituted”
. Anthropologists deployed ethnography in research as a methodological 
strategy to witness and analyze reception as a practice that constitutes part of a total 
cultural framework. The gap that ethnography is able to bridge between a macrocosmic 
conception of culture and its microcosmic enactment in everyday lives is located in the 
reception processes. Ethnographic research about public culture implicates reception in 
intricate ways. As Lila Abu- Lughod argues:  
58
Assessing reception is part of the methodological endeavor to interpret the social 
and political implications of a mass media production. To de- mystify the meanings and 
codes of a dramatic text can not happen according to the researcher’s own projections. It 
is the process of exploring individual dimensions of interpretation that allows 
possibilities to engage with the text from different perspectives. Ethnography in this 
.  
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sense gives the researcher the chance to embrace the discursiveness, contingency and 
unpredictability of the cultural phenomena. Seymour cites Valentin Volosinov59
“His work focuses on the sociohistorical dimensions of textual production and 
reception, arguing that the cultural competencies necessary for the interpretation 
of particular narratives are differentially distributed. Therefore, he argues that not 
everyone is situated identically in society, that their personal histories, social 
positions, as well as other aspects of their complex lives affect the ways in which 
they interpret, play with, consume, and/or are influenced by a given text”
: 
60
“However, by utilizing these methods and asking these questions, these 
researchers have moved to a ‘post- content’, ‘post- text’ era, raising serious 
questions about the production- consumption dichotomy itself. They question the 
utility of theorizing mass media’s relations to reality and the construction of social 
meaning, adding further complexity to the simple picture of media- message- 
transmission as a one way communication process”
 
 
In my thesis, I argue that ethnographic fieldwork, practiced with reflexivity, helps 
me re-examine my theoretical stance and my prejudiced assumptions about the social 
reality in Egypt by reaching out to the wide variety of receptive audience. This re- 
examination would be based on the ability to establish a set of relations that transcend the 
conventional research strategy to a more complex reading of the contexts and media of 
reception. Spitulnik elaborates on the questions that ethnography of mass media 
productions raises: 
61
 
 
 
 Ethnographic fieldwork would provide new insights to my previous awareness of 
the dominant discourses in the Egyptian society. By deciphering the mechanisms of 
reception and the correspondent discourses and meanings that stem from this interaction 
with the films Heen Maysara and El Lemby, the quality of change that shapes 
contemporary Egyptian public scenery is more tangible. Ethnography as a research tool 
allows me access to viewers, taking into consideration their class position, gender 
sensitivities and individual particularity.  
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2. 3. 2.  Ethnography: Culture as Praxis 
“Every society appears to bring to these ‘popular’ 
forms its own special history and traditions, its own 
cultural stamp, its own quirks and idiosyncrasies”62
 
. 
 I tried to elaborate on my understandings about an ethnographic study of public 
culture in the Egyptian context. I highlighted the theoretical backgrounds and the 
fundamental assumptions that render ethnography the method of choice for my research. 
Below I detail the process of ethnographic research starting from collecting data and 
ending with writing my thesis. My ethnographic research was primarily based on two 
central notions that shaped ethnographic encounters.  
The first one is related to time. Ethnographic study of contemporary media 
productions must be aware of its integration in the everyday as a contemporary 
expression and interaction. Such an awareness of the particularity of time of the 
community targeted by the study has two prospects. One is history and the second is the 
contemporary context of occurrence. Anthropological studies of public culture are, as 
Fabian states, part of the blurring of boundaries between ethnology/anthropology and 
history. An ethnographer must develop strategies to observe innovations and 
irregularities in and of the contemporary situation and follow spatial and temporal 
connections to continuously improve and refine his/ her participant observation and 
knowledge.  
In this thesis, I paid specific attention to the historical moment of production of 
Heen Maysara and El Lemby. I contend that the sociopolitical conditions during 2002- 
2008 greatly influenced the imagery of the lower classes in Egypt and the dominant 
discourses adopted by the Egyptian middle class as well. Describing the critical position 
and the precariousness of the moment of release of the movies became fundamental to 
my research. Navigating through the published newspaper articles and the TV programs 
that talked about the threat of Ashwaiyyat and the aggressive attacks on the film makers 
were part of my analysis. Also, depicting the extremist portrayals of the poor in both 
films and highlighting the facility in narrating their suffering were part of tracing the link 
to the haphazardness of the historical moment of production and consumption. Moreover, 
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I could not separate the contemporary moment and its precariousness from a continuous 
historical context that antedated 2002. I provided an analysis of preceding historical 
periods that structured the social imaginary of the middle class in Egypt and that 
propelled the emergence of the phenomena of Ashwaiyyat. From this position, I consider 
that in my ethnography of both films boundaries between description of representations 
and analysis of reality were eventually blurred. 
The second parameter of ethnographic research is concerned with language and 
the writing of ethnography. Language in an ethnographic study is cornerstone that 
influences the study at two principal levels. The first level is the translated and 
interpreted local language that forms the body of the collected data and informants’ 
commentaries and conversations. The second level is the language of writing 
ethnographic knowledge and communicating information, analysis and meaning. 
Language is therefore an instrument of power attributed to the ethnographer.  
Through the process of transcribing and translating his/her observations, the 
researcher is re-articulating the contemporary context and situating everyday practices 
within his/ her framework of analysis. The inevitability of linguistic misinterpretation 
challenges the notion of objectivity in a hermeneutic study:  
“Translating texts, often even merely transcribing them from recordings, can be a 
daunting task. Similarly, to perceive and interpret the richness of popular 
expression requires historically situated, shared knowledge that an ethnographer 
can never fully acquire. The study of ‘humble’ popular culture teaches us 
humility.”63
In short, achieving a ‘thick description’ of the media representation is an 
extremely challenging experience. Lila Abu- Lughod proposes that as ethnographers 
informed by microscopic descriptions, we should profit from the careful 
contextualization of the small and the large facts and events, thereby allowing us to frame 
multiple texts and sites within a specific place
 
64
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. Lila Abu- Lughod identifies two 
modalities of ethnographic research: mobile and multi-sited ethnography. She elaborates: 
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“Mobile ethnography moves out from the single sites and local situations of 
conventional research designs to examine the circulation of cultural meanings, 
objects, and identities in diffuse time- space. Second is multi- sited ethnography 
that depends on doing ethnographies of life- worlds in several locations- not 
haphazardly but with the intention of revealing the connections among them as 
the logic of larger systems within which particular lives unfold. The nation, it 
could be argued, is such a system.”65
2.3.3. Methods and Techniques of Research   
  
Abu- Lughod is expanding the space of ethnographic research by deploying the 
technique of thick description of the microcosmic practices to larger systems of meaning 
and operation. In my research about contemporary media productions in Egypt, I examine 
the performance of the state as a large system of power through the representation of its 
minor practices in everyday life. Media representations of ashwaiyyat and their dwellers 
convey the network of power relations that nurture and govern social interaction under 
the sovereignty of the Egyptian state. Ethnography of mass media in Egypt provides a 
methodological ability to interpret these representative instances according to broader 
circuits of power between the state and its subjects. Mobile ethnography and multi-sited 
ethnography as described by Abu- Lughod provide me as an ethnographer with an 
additional freedom while classifying, contextualizing and decoding knowledge gained 
through fieldwork.  
 
To integrate the previous theoretical trajectories in a comprehensible ethnography 
about the contemporary Egyptian media productions, my work is informed by the 
ethnographies of Walter Armbrust66 and Lila Abu- Lughod67 of the contemporary artistic 
productions in Egypt, in addition to the film ethnography “Lawrence of Arabia” of Steve 
Caton68
                                                     
65 . Ibid. 34. 
66 . Armbrust, Walter. 1996. Mass Culture and Modernism in Egypt. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press.  
67 . Abu- Lughod, L. 2005. “Part One: Anthropology and National Media” In Dramas of Nationhood: The 
Politics of Television in Egypt. Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press.   
68 . Caton, Steven C. 1999. “Lawrence of Arabia: A Film’s Anthropology”. Berkeley: University of 
California Press. 
. I pursued a thick description of the films and completed structured and semi- 
structured interviews with different agents under analytical categories of producers and 
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consumers of media. I supplemented these two methods with actual and contingent 
knowledge about the Egyptian sociopolitical context via multiple interlocuters, secondary 
literature, reports of organizations and newspapers. This approach is an attempt to 
redefine fieldwork in media studies and address the complexity of media reception, 
according to Patrick D. Murphy and Marwan M. Kraidy: 
 “Unlike the less closed- contexts and more performative- ritualized spaces that 
have been the customary sites for ethnographic inquiry throughout anthropology’s 
history, media technologies are creating increasingly intimate, microcosmic and 
virtual reception environments and practices. This makes of the notion of 
participant observation of media audiences extremely arduous in many cases, and 
suggests a rethinking of what constitutes “doing fieldwork”. Here we suggest that 
media ethnography be understood as a research process of forming communities 
and making conversations that underscore systematic and long- term investment 
in form, purpose and practice”69
1- Producers (cinema makers): These included scriptwriters Belal Fadl and Nasser 
Abd Al Rahman who wrote lot of films about ashwaiyyat in 2002- 2008, and two 
young film makers working at the national institute of cinema and the director 
Khairy Bishara as a key figure in the production of films about poor classes 
before 2002. 
. 
   
In this thesis, I conducted fifteen to twenty interviews with viewers from Egyptian 
middle and poor classes. This sporadic sample is intended to reflect a multiplicity of 
positions of reception that I would classify as follows: 
 
2- Audience: I interviewed three middle class national university students and an 
American university student. Moreover, I interviewed two female domestic 
workers who dwell in Al Marg (considered Ashwaiyy quarter). Both women 
offered such different visions and interpretations of the films and further 
elaborated on the everyday life and practices in ashwaiyyat especially on the level 
of interaction with state officers and administrators. I also interviewed prominent 
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critics that reviewed the films about ashwaiyyat like Tarek Al Shenawi and 
Safinaz Kazem. 
3- Ethnography of film: I present a content analysis of the two films Heen Maysara 
and El Lemby to elaborate first on their relations to the sociopolitical context and 
to explicate the connotations and discourses within their scenes. I draw on and 
analyze a large number of newspapers articles, TV programs and international 
organizations reports to shed light on internal and external views and analyses of 
the current situation in Egypt on social and political levels. I pay particular 
attention to the treatment of the notion of chaos in these texts and how they 
correspond to incidents and events reported in newspapers and documented by 
interlocutors. 
 
In my interviews with viewers and critics, I focused on various themes like how they 
received both movies and how they would connect (or not) the implied narratives to their 
everyday lives. I was interested in gathering their spontaneous reaction towards the 
characters as well as their intellectual contemplation about the position of poor and 
deprived subjects. Part of my questions were concentrating on mapping out the 
positionality of my subjects as middle class members and assessing the extent to which 
such position influenced their reception and tolerance of the characters and the storyline. 
I was concerned with following how my interlocutors established links between the social 
reality they live and survive, the state performance towards them as subjects and the 
media representations of the middle and lower classes in Heen Maysara and El Lemby. I 
also found it relevant, while interviewing critics and film producers, to collect technical 
data that would support my argument.     
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Chapter Three 
 
The Egyptian Postcolonial State (1952- 2008): Producing the social imaginary of the 
subordinate subjects 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
In this chapter I present an overview of the nature of power of the Egyptian 
postcolonial state since independence from the Ottoman Empire rule, signified by the 
military coup of 1952 and the withdrawal of the British colonizing forces in 1954. My 
focus primarily is on the mechanisms and the influences that configured the state/ citizens 
relationship during the rule of Gamal Abd El Nasser and Anwar Al Sadat, then following 
the structuring of this relationship under Mubarak (1980- present). Specifically, I 
emphasize how the projects and discourses adopted by the postcolonial state under each 
presidency affected the fields of artistic production particularly in the film industry. I 
argue that the postcolonial state in Egypt inherited the legacy of the colonial power thus 
reproducing colonizer/ colonized relationship as a model befitting its national subjects. 
The maintenance of such status of subordination of subjects has been a key priority of the 
political regime in Egypt since 1952, and continues until the present. 
 
Given this history of the independent postcolonial state in Egypt, I broaden my 
analytical framework to theoretical approaches beyond those usually adopted within 
Middle East Studies. I argue that in addition to such framework, analyses of the 
postcolonial states in Africa offer a rich analytical perspective from which to examine the 
case of Egypt. I contend that the precariousness and uncertainty of the sociopolitical 
conditions in Egypt (2002- 2008) are quiet significant features in reading the 
contemporary media representations and the way they are consumed. In what follows I 
elaborate on the limitations of analysis of state in the Middle East. To address these 
limitations, I rely on Achille Mbembe’s analysis  of the postcolonial states in Africa 
which guides my ethnographic interpretations of the films Heen Maysara and El Lemby. 
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Then, I trace how the constitution and the social imaginary of the Egyptian middle class 
was shaped after independence, exploring the different strategies and techniques 
deployed in its relations to the state and the larger sociopolitical context. In this respect, I 
argue that scrutinizing the history of the postcolonial state in Egypt from the perspective 
of middle class reconfiguration and transformation is indispensable to understanding how 
middle class members consume contemporary media productions. In the last section of 
this chapter, I provide a historical background about the emergence of ashwaiyyat in 
Egypt and I elaborate on my theoretical position concerning the perception of their 
dwellers in the official media.  
My concern in this chapter is thus to contextualize the two films Heen Maysara 
(2007) and El Lemby (2002), as contemporary media productions, within the historical 
and the present sociopolitical conditions of their production and consumption. This 
contextualization is necessary for my argument concerning the linkages between media 
representations and contemporary social realities in Egypt Mubarak’s regime. 
 
3.2. Middle Eastern ‘Exceptionalism’ versus Postcolonial ‘Precariousness’ 
 
 In this section, I propose to examine the Egyptian postcolonial state by situating it 
at the nexus of Middle East and sub- Saharan theorists of postcoloniality. I contend that 
narrowing my analysis to the geopolitical confines of Middle East engagements would 
produce yet another account of a modern state that gained independence after withdrawal 
of the colonizing British and Ottoman forces in 1954. Such an account fails short of 
illuminating the intricacies of the contemporary historical moment in Egypt, specifically 
the nature of power of the national political regime and its relations to colonial power on 
one hand and to its national subjects on the other. 
 I argue that Middle Eastern studies usually posit non-Western states in the 
Middle East as ones that adopted modern institutions of rule and hence are capable of 
functioning according to modern systems of governance. To account for the prevailing 
and varied forms of authoritarianism such studies resort to the analytical categories of 
‘cultural relativism’ and ‘Middle East exceptionalism’. Theorists of Middle Eastern 
40 
 
studies like Ellis Goldberg70, Eberhard Kienle71 and Roger Owen72
“Matters become still more complex when we turn to non –European world in 
general, and to the Middle East in particular. By and large most of the political 
writing concerned with defining the state, together with an associated vocabulary 
involving such key terms as ‘legitimacy, ‘hegemony’ and ‘authority’, took place 
not only in Europe but also on the basis of an evaluation of a purely European 
experience. Some of this thinking was then transposed to a discussion of the state 
outside Europe without any great concern to whether it made sense in what was 
obviously a different historical and cultural environment. It follows that it also 
must be amenable to much the same analyses of their strengths and weaknesses as 
their European neighbors. And as always this helps to create a counter-position: 
The view that Western- type states are inappropriate for the Middle East, that they 
lack roots and cultural meaning, and therefore are bound to perform badly and, 
indeed, to make the difficulties of the government a great deal worse.”
 view Islamic religion 
and culture as part of the Middle Eastern states’ particularity and point out that they are 
partly responsible for the development of authoritarian rule in the Middle East. Owen 
stresses that an inherent cultural model is behind the incongruence between Middle 
Eastern states and the Western-type modern state: 
73
This tendency is best exemplified in Joel Migdal’s definition of non-European 
state model where he borrows the exact terminology and connotations of a European state 
        
 
 And despite that Owen admits a Eurocentric academic discourse that creates a 
‘counter-position’ concerning the Middle Eastern sates’ classification, he could not 
distinguish between the distorted inheritance of a European state model and the 
inheritance of a Western colonial legacy that was transposed and replicated in the 
state/subjects relationship after independence. It seems as if those theorists are 
incarnating two historically separate theoretical paradigms and approaches to state 
building processes in the Middle East: one is of the model of Western modern state which 
is not applicable to Middle East (for lacking ‘cultural meaning’), and the other is a 
temporal and theoretical disconnected that undermines the effects of the lengthy eras of 
colonization on the contemporary modes of governance in the Middle East.  
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while excluding the signs of colonial influence, particularly the inheritance of a 
colonizer/ colonized relationship premised on the deployment of violence by the ruler on 
the ruled. Migdal identifies a non-European state as: “an organization, composed of 
numerous agencies led and coordinated by the state’s leadership (executive authority) 
that has the ability to make and implement the binding rules for all the people as well as 
the parameters of rule making for other social organizations in a given territory, using 
force of necessary to have its way”74 Following this definition, Owen delineated the 
reasons behind the emergence of authoritarian regimes in the Middle East. He argues that 
borrowing an artificial modern state model from the colonial power (i.e. a centralized 
administration, a legal system, a flag, and internationally recognized boundaries) 
produced an exaggerated need for policing and achieving control over the boundaries and 
the subjects on the part of the state75
“And since, in Africa both before and after colonization, state power enhanced its 
value by establishing specific relations of subjection, something must be said 
about the relationships between subjection, the distribution of wealth and tribute, 
and the more general problem of the constitution of the postcolonial subject. The 
second factor is that postcolonial African regimes have not invented what they 
know of government from scratch. Their knowledge is the product of several 
cultures, heritages, and traditions of which the features have become entangled 
over time, to the point where something has emerged that has the look of ‘custom’ 
without being reducible to it, and partakes of ‘modernity’ without being wholly 
included in it. One part of this knowledge or rationality is colonial rationality.”
.   
In contrast, Achille Mbembe theorized the complex structure of the postcolonial 
state in Africa within a framework that escaped the dichotomy between the local culture 
and the colonial power legacies. In his analysis of the postcolonial state in Cameroon, 
Mbembe described the process of the making of the ruling regimes in the postcolony. He 
postulated: 
76
 In my ethnography of the films Heen Maysara and El Lemby, I trace and unpack 
such relations of subjection as an essential feature of the performance of the Egyptian 
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state in the postcolonial era. I deploy the two axioms identified by Mbembe namely 
wealth and tribute distribution and the creation of the postcolonial subject, in interpreting 
first the gaze of a privileged middle class towards the dwellers of ashwaiyyat,  second the  
police coercion and violence towards the national subjects. Such an approach allows me 
to critically examine multiple phenomena described in the Middle East, especially the 
emphasis on policing and control, the expansion of state apparatus and bureaucracy and 
the authoritarian modes of governance without reducing it to a dichotomy of cultural and 
historical disjuncture. Further, understanding the coloniality of power from Mbembe’s 
perspective substantiates my argument concerning the relation between the longevity of 
the ruling regime in Egypt and the perpetuation of the rule of exception and 
unconditionality. 
 Mbembe outlines the following criteria of the ruling regimes in postcolonial 
Africa: Being based on a regime of exception that departed from the ‘common law’, 
lacking autonomous institutions, instating a system of privileges and immunities that 
enhanced the civil society stratification to inscribe the reality of inequality, providing no 
limits for state authority especially on the juridical system and deploying violence as the 
essence of the sovereignty of the state. The next section, I will use these criteria to 
highlight how the middle class imaginary was shaped by the postcolonial state in Egypt 
(1952- 2008). I will also trace how the behavior of the Egyptian state in different 
historical periods affected the position and constitution of this class and consequently its 
relation to the lower classes, and shaped the nature of social discourses produced by the 
middle class and are partly exemplified in media representations 
  
3.3. The Social Imaginary of the Egyptian Middle Class (1952- 2008): A History of 
Ascension and Decline 
 
It can be argued that the foundation of the first independent Egyptian state in 
modern history was officially declared in 1954 following the military coup led by Gamal 
Abdel Nasser77
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enthusiasm for a radical nationalist policy. However, during his ruling period, the Egyptian state 
 in 1952. However, the declaration of the independent postcolonial state 
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was preceded by a struggle for independence from British colonization of Egypt that 
persisted from 1882 until 1951. This prolonged struggle capitalized on including the 
educated sectors of the Egyptian populace under the umbrella of a nationalistic discourse 
that strives for independence as the only pathway to reform and renaissance78. 
Conceiving an authentic Egyptian identity was one of the tasks that were carried out 
actively by many political and social leaders in Egypt, especially after the 1919 
revolution under the leadership of Saad Zaghloul of the Wafd Party79
According to Galal Amin, this mobilization of the educated professionals and 
bureaucrats in 1919 can be considered the primary stage in the conception of a well 
defined Egyptian middle class
. The liberal Wafd 
party’s intellectuals at the time contributed immensely to portraying the aspired 
independent nation as a potentially modern state with a remarkable influence of 
enlightenment ideals on their discourse.  
80. Amin postulates that the Egyptian middle class achieved 
relative independence by 1922, thus drafting the first Egyptian constitution in 1923, and 
establishing the first Egyptian bank. Moreover, Amin asserts that this class was active 
and productive in both industrial and cultural fields. The Egyptian middle class founded 
Cairo University in 1908 and produced magnificent works of art, music and theatre and 
led a respectful struggle to reform the religious discourse and rejuvenate the literature and 
artistic domains81
                                                                                                                                                              
consolidated the rule of dictatorship and adopted strict security measures against free expression and 
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.  When the Nasser regime came to power in 1954, it profited from the 
privileged middle class’s achievements and deployed its hegemony on both the political 
and cultural realms in Egypt. The state then relied on the prevalent cultural and social 
discourse that consolidated the aspirations for a modern state on a “classical Western 
model” much as on an “independent” one with clear local and national identity 
fundamentals.  
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The independent postcolonial state thus capitalized on this hybrid discourse to 
initiate its mode of rule82. However, the transition to postcoloniality followed a pathway 
that influenced the state/subjects relationship in many ways. Mbembe argues that a role 
exchange happens between the rulers of the postcolonial state and their precedent 
colonizers. This exchange implies two notions of commandment that prevail in a colony 
and are then transferred to the postcolony. The first is ‘founding violence’ which 
becomes the main determinant of the relation between colonizer/native (now 
state/citizen). This violence is meant to underpin the ‘right of conquest’, in Mbembe’s 
words, of the state as a sole power of judging and legitimating social practices. The 
second notion is using the power (“founding violence”) to structure activities and 
strategies of all social agents and shaping the public domain to tighten its control over its 
subjects. Mbembe contends that the state has to “help produce an imaginary capacity 
converting the founding violence into authorizing authority”83
 “Since the 1952 revolution, the Egyptian state has defined itself as a welfare 
state concerned with its citizens’ social reproduction. Welfare provisions were 
fundamental to the ideological justifications of the ruling regime in post- 
revolutionary Egypt. Further, they have entered into the terms organizing 
. The merger between the 
state role as an absolute authoritarian power on one hand, and the state as the beholder of 
the independent nation’s renaissance project befits Nasser’s period in Egypt (1954- 
1970). The welfare project adopted by the state enormously affected the structuring 
process of the Egyptian middle class and consequently its imaginary and media 
productions. 
 
3.3.1. The Welfare Project: Granting Privilege to Guarantee Subordination 
 
The Nasser regime announced a project of reform and renaissance that gathered 
the aspirations of the independent nation and centralized the role of the state in the 
political structure as the sole agent to carry it out. Salwa Ismail defines this mission as the 
“project of the welfare state”: 
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state- society relations as embodied in the notion of the social contract. The 
policies and the laws that marked the outlines of this contract conveyed a 
populist bent reinforced by rhetoric on popular alliances and the elimination 
of class antagonism.”84
The quest for modernization and progress served usually as the imaginary space 
through which the state emphasized its social domination and interference in all aspects 
of the public life
 
 
85. The police state during the Nasser era was masked by the ability of 
the state to provide the basic social and economic needs (free education, health insurance 
and work) and imbuing it with nationalistic socialist mottos (Ibid, 52). Nikloas Rose and 
Peter Miller affirm this relation: “The logic of the welfare programs involves the 
delineation of a sphere of government intervention separate from the political but 
networked with it and having as its broader purpose the governing of the population”86
During this time Egypt witnessed a huge expansion of the bureaucracy, the police 
and the army as well as the number of public enterprises. Owen claims that the need to 
maintain security after the departure of the colonial power, the drive to establish control 
over the whole of the new national territory and the desire to use the state to promote 
large programs of economic development and social welfare, were behind such an 
expansion
. 
87
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. However, he also argues that the state guaranteed immunities and enormous 
power to individuals at the apex of the regime which ended in the creation of an 
authoritarian system where power is highly centralized and the state assumes monopoly 
on every kind of political activity. Simultaneously, the regime was taking radical steps to 
achieve land reform (1952), constructing the high dam of Aswan and inaugurating the 
Helwan steel and iron complex in 1954. The nationalization of Suez canal in 1956 
stimulated further state-led developments culminating in the first five-year plan (1960-
46 
 
1965) and the nationalization of the Egyptian private banks and other factories and 
enterprises in 1960-196188
The state, under the rule of Nasser, increasingly acquired a wide base of 
supporters and accomplished its hegemony on the political and public domains through a 
series of service institutions (expansion of free education, providing employment in the 
public sector, subsidization of foodstuffs) and a ‘clientalistic’ political machinery that 
constituted the essence of its rule
. 
89. This base was founded essentially on expanding the 
Egyptian middle class by embracing members from the lower classes who benefitted 
from free education and joined public professions as well as members from the Egyptian 
rural areas after the land reform and the consequential growth of the agricultural sector 
and land ownership90. The obvious growth of the state apparatus due to the increase of 
general employment can be demonstrated by the rise of the number of Egyptian 
employed in bureaucracy and public enterprises from 350,000 in 1951/2 to over 
1,000,000 in 1965/6 and the doubling of the number of state ministries from 15 to 29 
during the same period91
The artistic scenery in Egypt was greatly influenced by these transformations. The 
major institutions of art and media production were confiscated by the state and were 
deployed to propagate the slogans of the ruling elite and create a concensus on the 
fundamentals of the 1952 revolution. Inflamed lyrics of patriotic songs, imbued with 
nationalist sentiments and full support of the Egyptian political regime (usually reduced 
to become the persona of the Egyptian president) played important part in producing the 
nationalist image of the postcolonial Egyptian state during the time between 1952 and 
1973. Abd El Halim Hafez, the well-known Egyptian legendary crooner, was honorably 
recognized for his contribution in mediating the nationalist socialist discourse of the 
Nasser state to his audience
. 
92
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. Halim's songs described in great detail the strategic 
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projects of Nasser, as well as his promises and ambitions for the renaissance of the 
independent Egyptian Republic. Artists and their productions were perceived by the state 
as national symbols who were assigned a patriotic mission to promote and reinforce a 
collective national emotion that unified the entire Egyptian nation at that time93
 The singers of the patriotic songs (Halim and Um Kulthum, for example) 
identified themselves as  carriers of the nation's values and aspirations, additional soldiers 
in the nation's struggle for independence and progress. The artists were alleged to be 
proud being servants of the 'state' and ‘representatives of the nation'
. Through 
artistic productions (songs, plays and movies), the social imaginary of a burgeoning 
middle class started to identify with media productions fashioned according to the nation-
state agenda, reflecting state’s ideology, glorifying its leader and disseminating his ideas 
to the populace above all other considerations. 
94
“The narratives of pre-1970 cinema were founded on the coupling of technique 
with authenticity, whether of the classicist or local variety; or conversely, on 
. Egyptian media 
productions in this sense remained an expression of cooperation and acceptance of the 
general political themes propagated by the state for the welfare of the nation and its 
people. In this respect, it is important to clarify that venues of media productions such as 
television, cinema production companies, theatres and radio stations, were nationalized 
by the state and were run under meticulous supervision of the state bureaucracy.  
Artistic productions were geared to attract the educated Egyptian middle class 
impatient to attune itself to the combined authenticity and modernism discourse of 
Nasser.  To serve this purpose, the confiscated national cinema institutions produced 
Egyptian films that carved the image of the expanding middle class in the social 
imaginary. They focused on reproducing the dual state discourse on modernization and 
authenticity, emphasizing and hailing the middle class as the beholder of the Egyptian 
renaissance. The films featured the collapse of the feudal traditions and the extravagantly 
rich people under the pressures of the burgeoning educated middle class armed with 
knowledge and virtues of socialism and popular class alliances. Armbrust describes how 
the Egyptian cinema pre-1970s depicted the ambitions of the middle class to achieve a 
complex process of transition from the traditional to the modern society: 
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calling attention to situations that contravened the joining of modernity with 
tradition. The synthesized modernity with tradition, often in the character of the 
educated bureaucrat or professional, was an important part of the narrative 
structure of many films from the period, and was often implicit in films that did 
not make such characters their central focus.”95
Egypt’s political and artistic fields of production were dramatically affected by 
the 1967 military defeat of Egypt and the consequent Israeli occupation of Sinai.  The 
death of Nasser in 1970 and the strategic political and economic shifts of his successor 
Anwar Al Sadat, especially his open-door economic policy and his visit to Jerusalem, 
marked the symbolic, and in many ways the actual, announcement of failure of the 
socialist Nasserite project
 
  
 It is significant in this respect to mention films like Rod Qalbi (Return my Heart) 
1957, Ana Horra (I Am Free) 1959 and Al Aidy al Naema (The Soft Hands) 1963 that 
portrayed the ascension of lower classes to join the middle class after pursuing education 
and training (The hero becoming an army officer in Rod Qalbi or an editor in chief in 
Ana Horra). The characters asserted the value of hard work, equality, respect for the poor 
and social alliance (for instance the figure of the beloved poor father in Rod Qalbi and the 
repellent rich yet unemployed man in Al Aidy al Naema).  
 
3. 3. 2.  The Withdrawal of the State and Anti-modernist Discourse 
 
96.  These developments compelled the Egyptian educated 
middle class to critically interrogate the nationalist short past. The depiction of 
oppressiveness and censorship as the major criteria of the Nasser state propelled primary 
claims for political and economic liberalism to emerge and gain recognition and 
appreciation. The indisputable ability of the rising Egyptian nation to achieve economic 
welfare, political independence and social justice were perceived with skepticism97
                                                     
95 . .Armbrust, Walter. 1995. “New Cinema, Commercial Cinema, and the Modernist Tradition in Egypt”, 
in Alif: Journal of Comparative Poetics, No. 15, Arab Cinematics: Toward the New and the Alternative, P. 
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The Egyptian and Arab peoples started to lose faith in the fundamental 
assumptions of the Arab nationalist project. On the other hand, the technological 
revolution that allowed the huge circulation of the video and cassette tapes in Egypt in 
the seventies provided new spaces for the once marginalized artists to articulate their 
artistic projects outside the domination of the state98. Egyptian citizens for the first time 
were allowed to break free from a monolithic hegemonic discourse constructed to 
underpin the state project. The phenomenological success of the shaabi singer Ahmed 
Adaweya after the release of his own cassettes in the 1970s threatened the superstars of 
the official media, such as Halim, selling over one million copies of his first commercial 
release (1977). Aided by an increasingly cynical populace and a burgeoning cassette 
culture, Adaweya opened the gates for a chain of crooners to dump the Egyptian markets 
with shaabi music and films starred by heroes from the poor classes99
 “It would not be an exaggeration to describe the new popular culture style as 
basically anti-modernist… Consequently, the most important change in the 
‘mythic patterning’ of post-1970s Egyptian popular art is that the synthesizing 
ideal evident in earlier films is absent. The sort of middle class modernist hero so 
common in earlier films has, since the 1970s, been either beleaguered or 
humiliated. These anti-modernist films are part of a widespread discourse on 
popular art which encompasses media other than the cinema”
.  By this time, the 
word shaabi would still be associated with vulgarity, backwardness and lower class 
chants in contradistinction to the 'authenticity' discourse that used to characterize the 
transformative discourse of modernist nationalism in the sixties. 
The trend of representing the social alliance between a skillful and wise middle 
class and the uneducated yet virtuous and honest poor classes started to decline in the 
seventies. The sociopolitical context affected the media productions of the time. 
Armbrust states: 
100
 The cinematic representation of the middle class and poor heroes became 
equivalent to their deteriorating symbolic value in the prevalent social discourse. The 
.   
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cinematic representation was greatly affected by the change in their social positioning 
and constraining economic situation. However, other authors like Galal Amin assume 
that the middle class kept growing after the inauguration of the open door policies in 
1974 through the inclusion of bigger numbers of members of the lower classes who 
profited from the open door policies and the labor migration to the oil-rich gulf countries 
and Libya101
A significant portion of the cinematic production in late 1970s and 1980s
. According to Amin, the opportunities for social mobility and ascension 
through non-productive economic activities, like brokerage or foreign currency exchange, 
introduced moral and ethical transformations of the growing middle class. An obsession 
with consumption and wealth acquisition characterized the behavior of a wide sector of 
the Egyptian people. 
102 
focused on stories that depict the rapid ascent of a nouveaux riches businessmen class 
who deployed illegal means of wealth accumulation during the presidency of Anwar Al 
Sadat103
In short, the political and economic conditions have been drastically altered in 
Egypt disturbing the classical class structures configured under Nasser. After the 
adoption of the open door policy in the seventies, the class hierarchy in Egypt took a 
 (1970- 1981) as a direct consequence of the corrupt implementation of  the open 
door policies. These cinematic productions increasingly represented the predicament of 
the middle class bureaucracy struggling with the economic imbalance between their 
salaries and the constantly rising cost of living. They also detailed the social deterioration 
of the middle class and mapped out the difficulties that professionals (especially doctors 
and engineers) face after losing the privileges they acquired under the socialist regime of 
Nasser.  
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different trajectory. The middle class (as defined in the sixties; educated professionals 
and state’s employees) started to lose its privileged positions within state policies and 
development projects. Under the rule of Al Sadat, there were marked deficiencies in 
providing basic subsidized services like education and health, which kept on deteriorating 
in a remarkable fashion over the following decades. The limitation of the social security 
policies started to increase the gaps in the Egyptian social safety net and confirmed 
state’s withdrawal from its welfare project. This withdrawal undermined the ability of the 
Egyptian state to present itself as the provider for its citizens104. The ideals of equality 
and just distribution of wealth were challenged by the neoliberal principles that sought a 
de-statization of the government105
In the previous section, I tried to highlight how the postcolonial state in Egypt 
carved its image in the social imaginary as what Mbembe termed a “total cosmology for 
its subjects”. This unremitting historical process was based on an assemblage of ideas, 
discourses and images that put emphasis on the grotesque and obscene nature of the state 
power into the collective consciousness thus inscribing the state as a fetish in the 
everyday practices of its people
. A state of mistrust started to emerge between the 
Egyptians and their “fatherly” state with its ambitious modernist discourse.  
 
3. 3. 3. Mubarak: The Rule of Impunity and the Perception of the Poor   
 
106. Mbembe contends that a relationship of “conviviality” 
is the guarantee to preserve the subjection and submission of the postcolonial state 
subjects. This conviviality unifies the rulers and the ruled in a ‘simulacrum’ or a system 
of symbolic metaphors of mutual appreciation and apprehension that end up robbing both 
parties of their vitality creating ultimately an indigent environment of zombies107
Under the rule of Mubarak (1981-present), the performance of the government 
and the steps it took towards the adoption of neoliberal policies implicitly announced that 
. This 
description perfectly applies to the Egyptian state under Mubarak’s regime.  
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the state has given up the welfare project108. Mubarak’s regime promoted a rapid 
liberalization and implemented different measures to introduce free market policies and 
to privatize the public sector. The interference and influence of several transnational 
organizations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank under 
the rubric of ‘structural adjustment’ was extensively expanding109
This shift can be viewed as part of the neoliberal paradigm that aims at relocating 
programs of government from state institutions to non-state sites and actors
. 
110. This 
interference, sometimes viewed as a serious erosion of the sovereignty of the state111
“It indicates a new modality of government, which works by creating mechanisms 
that work ‘all by themselves’ to bring about governmental results through the 
devolution of risk onto the enterprise or the individual and the responsibilization 
of subjects who are increasingly empowered to discipline themselves”
, 
represented and ushered a new “given” in the relations of the postcolonial state to its 
international allies on the one hand and its local subjects on the other.  The process of 
autonomization of local entities (such as grass-root NGOs) under global governmentality 
constituted a direct threat to the traditional system of governance that reigned in Egypt 
since 1954: 
112
 The regime of Mubarak was compelled to allow relative freedom of expression 
and to permit political spaces that were formerly seized by the state, like independent 
newspapers and satellite channels
. 
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. Hegemonic global discourses about minority rights, 
human rights, personal freedoms and democracy increasingly invaded the social 
discourse in Egypt. Different religious minorities in Egypt were encouraged by the 
relative freedom of expression to protest religious persecution and to ask actively for 
their equal citizenship rights and freedom of belief. Orthodox Copts and Bahais spoke out 
either in the streets or in courtrooms demanding equal representation in society. 
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Geographically marginalized social groups in Sinai, for example, engaged in bloody 
violent confrontations with the state police objecting to their marginalized indigent 
situation and their exclusion from state plans of development and reform (International 
Crisis Group, 2007). The economically marginalized also benefited from the political 
window of opportunity opened by the external discourse and pressure. In 2006 and 2007, 
a series of strikes and sit-ins were carried out by many workers and employees in the 
public sector who were demanding an increase in their wages and salaries114
This set of ‘spontaneous’ protest movements began among the educated middle 
class as in the case of members of Kefaya (the Egyptian movement for change) in 2005
.  
115
“The protests of the poor were witnessed in some regions of Cairo and the 
governorates (Portsaid and elsewhere) to demand housing. The real dimensions of 
this problem were revealed with Kale’et Al Kabsh accidents in Al Sayeda Zeinab 
quarter. The ‘poor’ had learned the act of demonstrating in front of the Council of 
Ministers, the Parliament, the Governor’s headquarters. They now know the way 
to the satellite channels and the independent newspapers… The third aspect of the 
public protest movements is protesting to get loaf of bread from the bakeries of 
Egypt. Hundreds and thousands demonstrate in the Egyptian governorates 
(especially Southern Egypt) only to get the subsidized loaf of bread. In August 
2007, people broke in a bakery in Southern Egypt to get their bread before it 
being stolen by the bread ‘mafia’.”
 
as well as state employees suffering from diminishing values of their salaries compared 
to the rising costs of living. Eventually, workers and poor dwellers of ashwaiyyat invaded 
the scene and started for the first time their organized sit-ins in request for clean water, 
subsidized bread and dignified housing. It is becoming ordinary and routine subject of 
daily news in Egypt (2007- 2008), to read and hear about hundreds or thousands of 
Egyptians rioting in different governorates to fight for their basic needs like food and 
housing. Amani Kandil reports: 
116
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These sorts of protests that included for the first time ordinary non-politicized 
people, not led or previously planned by intellectual entities or political parties, reflect 
the degree of deterioration in the economic affairs in Egypt.  It was obvious by then that 
Egyptian workers and employees, minorities and political activists had given up on their 
‘conviviality’ with the state, and revolted against the subjection relationship. The 
deterioration of the economic situation, the suffocating political repression and the 
complete withdrawal of the state from the implicit social contract justified the shift. 
Moreover, the development and spread of consciousness of protest among the silent 
masses was facilitated by the active media coverage and pressures of the international 
and transnational agents mobilized the silenced strata. The media representation of the 
marginalized sectors (including cinema) bore eventually its effects. They finally came to 
perceive themselves as part of the social polity with rights which they pushed to insert 
within the crowded state agenda.  
This mobility introduced new sets of meanings and symbols that permeated the 
social discourse and disentangled the ruled from the ‘simulacrum’. The disengagement of 
the state from its social responsibility ignited a backlash among the neglected subjects. 
However, these oppositions and protests stimulated an unprecedented aggression on the 
part of the state. The political regime striving for the total encompassment of public 
affairs and prioritizing security purposes above all considerations had to react brutally to 
this threat. This violent reaction was intended to prolong the life of a deteriorating state 
which had lost its principal advantage viz a viz its subjects by abondoning the welfare 
project.  
In this section, I paid exclusive attention to the mechanisms by which a sense of 
absurdity and a state incoherence were inscribed in the social consciousness in 
contemporary Egypt (2002-2008). These sensibilities, consequently, became almost an 
indispensable and essential component that influenced the actions of people and infused 
their daily comportment with impunity and violence, no matter what social class they 
belonged to. The media representations of the contemporary social reality as exemplified 
in Heen Maysara and El Lemby reflected this absurdity and incoherence. As I argue, the 
middle class produced cinema however confined such phenomena to Ashwaiyyat and 
55 
 
their residents in a desperate attempt to deny the expanse of chaos, violence, brutality and 
precariousness in the society at large. As I will detail in the next chapters analyzing the 
two movies, the predicament that encompassed a whole society struggling under the rule 
of the postcolonial state was projected on the poor classes. Additionally, the figure of the 
poor and ashwaiyyat dweller was constructed in such a manner as to render them the 
source of threat par excellence. 
3.4.  Ashwaiyyat: The Phenomena and the Discourse 
 
One of the major consequences of the shift from the “welfare state project” to the 
“neoliberal state project”, as Ismail argues, was the decline in state provision of 
subsidized housing and the rising costs for real estate in planned areas of the city. This 
decline was behind the emergence of Cairo’s new popular quarters in the 1970s, as a 
result of the restless communal efforts to provide cheap housing and acquire residential 
spaces. Informal housing communities increased gradually during the last forty years117
“The unaffordable prices of newly built formal housing exclude the low- income 
groups from the housing market. Thus, there remains no other option for young 
people, in particular those who intend to start a family, but to seek housing in the 
informal market. Hence, they venture out to join the “outsiders” who inhabit the 
large ashwaiyyat, the informal agglomerations surrounding metropolitan areas. 
Many of the inhabitants of these communities still depend on job opportunities 
within metropolitan areas, to which they commute daily. However, their 
residential communities are more than simply functional “dormitories”
. 
Asef Bayat argues that the emergence of ashwaiyyat was a reaction to the stabilization 
and diffusion of urbanization outside of the cities and urban centers, primarily for 
economic reasons: 
118
Bayat’s argument presents urban expansion in ashwaiyyat as a reflection of the 
serious economic condition that renders informal urban spaces not only dwellings for the 
lower marginalized classes but also for the struggling lower middle class that may 
possess a fair educational level and a public profession. This fact challenges the classical 
conception in the dominant discourse about ashwaiyyat as spaces that breed lawlessness, 
. 
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extremism, crime and poverty and re-situate them as integral part of the national 
economy and population. However, it sheds light on the nature of an internal dialogue 
swirling inside the Egyptian society about the transformations that occurred to the class 
hierarchy and the threats of decline and collapse preoccupying the minds of the Egyptian 
middle class. 
 
3. 4. 1. Ashwaiyyat in social imaginary and discourse 
 
Within a short span of time, the ashwaiyy quarters increased, acquiring new forms 
that reflected their informal infiltration of agricultural land, the unplanned construction 
and the illegal acquisition of the basic services like water, sewage and electricity119
“Thus, those neighborhoods where buildings have no permits, where streets have 
no formal name, where men wear the traditional galabiyya, where women sit and 
socialize in front of their homes in the alleyways and where adults are largely 
active in the informal economy are considered as ‘non- modern’ and thus 
‘abnormal’. Moreover, these settlements are not even thought of as part of the 
modern city since their inhabitants, mainly migrants, are seen to have, in effect, 
‘ruralized’ their settlements”
. One 
of the consequences of the neglect by the state is that the dwellers of these quarters 
acquired relative autonomy in establishing their houses on agricultural lands and 
providing living services like water and electricity illegally. These informal communities 
however escaped the regulatory power of the state and urban planning departments of the 
government. Discipline and organization of daily life became internal responsibilities 
carried out by the dwellers themselves ignoring the legal procedures and the role of state 
professionals. The continuous exclusion of ashwaiyyat from urban participation, 
primarily on the part of the state, encouraged the development of a social discourse that 
defined ashwaiyyat as ‘non-modern’ and ‘abnormal’ spaces and synthesized their 
dwellers as ‘outsiders’: 
120
In the 1980s and 1990s, and due to the concentration of the terrorist Islamist 
groups in ashwaiyyat (particularly in Imbaba), the public discourse about ashwaiyyat 
. 
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turned from indifference to hostility121
            “Hence, state authorities started to see these communities not only as an urban 
management challenge but also as a security threat. In dealing with the Islamists 
and with the informal housing communities, the state-in particular its security 
apparatus and urban planning directorates - constructed the challenge in terms of 
an urban pathology. The communities and their residents were represented as 
problematic, marginal; disintegrate elements of the urban setting”
.  Stressing the chaotic nature of these quarters and 
the vulgar and disorganized mannerisms of their inhabitants, the Egyptian media 
portrayed ashwaiyyat as an incubatory medium for terrorists, criminals and fanatics. 
Ismail describes how the confrontation between the Islamists and the Egyptian 
government influenced the public discourse about ashwaiyyat: 
122
In the last decade, ashwaiyy quarters (as they are usually labeled in the Egyptian 
media) reached one thousand and two hundred regions according to the latest statistics of 
the housing ministry. Fifteen millions of the Egyptian population (77 millions in 2008) 
are claimed to dwell in these communities
.  
 
The official state media supported this hostile tone and played a positive role in 
coupling ashwaiyyat with terrorism and vulgarity in the consciousness of middle class 
recipients. The television series “Al Aela” (the family) 1994 and the film “Al Erhaby” 
(the terrorist) 1995 presented two similar characters of terrorists that grew up in 
ashwaiyyat and committed horrible crimes against innocent middle class people. 
However, after 2002, this discourse began to face problems due to the overlapping 
discourse in the independent media about injustice and inhumane lives of people in these 
quarters. Moreover, the Egyptian cinema integrated ashwaiyyat in its matrix and 
represented the issues and concerns of their dwellers in its recent productions.  
123
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. The growth and increase of ashwaiyy 
quarters stands as a counter-phenomena to the rising numbers of the recently emerging 
private compounds with lavish properties and luxurious equipments that express an urban 
polarization and social cleavage taking place in Egyptian society at present. The upper 
classes are intentionally distancing their private life from the sight and severity of poverty 
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and from the anticipated violence of the marginalized and impoverished groups dwelling 
in ashwaiyyat. 
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Chapter Four 
Heen Maysara and El Lemby: The hidden fears of a threatened class 
4.1. Introduction 
 In this chapter I outline the ideas and social debates surrounding the 
production and the big success of Heen Maysara and El Lemby in the Egyptian box 
office. I aspire to present different views that convey a general image of how the middle 
class imagines and constitutes its relation to the poor and how such imaginary reflects the 
precarious positionality I detailed in chapter 3. I rely on comments of regular viewers, 
critics and film makers and on the published literature about the films and the current 
situation of the Egyptian middle class. 
4.2. “Heen Maysara”: The Debate and the Predicament 
“From the very beginning of Heen Maysara (Whenever it is possible), I knew that 
no sympathetic relationship could be established between me and this film”, Ahmed 
Awny, a mechanical engineering young student argues in a personal interview. Awny (21 
years old) was speaking about the avant-titre of the film in the form of a photomontage of 
several Egyptian newspapers’ headlines announcing the danger of the growing 
ashwaiyyat in Egypt. Khaled Youssef, the director of the film, collected captions like 
‘The tumor of ashwaiyyat is spreading all over Egypt’ ‘Tombs turned into haphazard 
houses’, and ‘Enough disasters’ that were laid against a bloody red background. In 
contrast to what the images exposed, a rhythmic introductory song by a shaabi124
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 voice 
complaining: 
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 “I am not lucky enough. And it doesn’t fit me to fall in love. They say even the 
blessing of sight is too much for us. And if we tried to find happiness they will destroy 
our universe” 
From the very first minutes, contradictory messages about the film were revealed; 
slogans about the threat of ashwaiyyat to the rest of society, yet the lyrics spoke about the 
deep pains of the people dwelling in them. Khaled Youssef and Nasser Abd Al Rahman, 
director and scriptwriter, decided to address a popular half-hazard quarter and deliver a 
shocking image of its reality to the middle class from which comes the majority of the 
audience of contemporary Egyptian cinema. Khaled Youssef asserted this intention: 
“Heen Maysara is a warning message for the whole society, government and 
people, that the ashwaiyy quarters surrounding Cairo are occult bombs that may 
explode anytime and for the weakest reasons in the face of the sophisticated 
neighborhoods. The film also stresses that these areas became centers that provide 
incubation for the destructive fanatics, homeless street children and unemployed 
people who threaten those people around them by every means.”125
“He is expressing the anxiety of his class; he makes a film about poor people to 
avoid their explosion in the face of the middle class to which he belongs. He even said 
that he directs his film to the government which is totally unthinkable, I couldn’t believe 
this…” Awny resumed in our interview with remarkable irony. Youssef, though not 
hiding the targeted audience and the ideological frame he is working within, always 
claimed that he possessed a natural inclination to advocate for the poor classes and their 
rights which is reflected in his movies. He also said that his film is speaking about the 
completely disorganized society we all live in, where the political decisions, success, 
failure and death are controlled by totally haphazard factors
 
126
Youssef narrated in his film a tragedy based on three main stories occurring in 
and around an informal poor quarter in Cairo. The first one was the story of Adel 
Hashisha (a nickname related to hash) the principal male character in the film, who 
struggles with his extremely constraining economic conditions. Compelled to afford the 
expenses of living for his mother and sister’s numerous children, Hashisha finds himself 
.  
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involved in some illegal activities including drug dealing and thuggery as a means of 
earning money and acquiring notability and relative authority inside his district. Hashisha 
partly cooperates with the official security apparatus in reporting information about 
Islamist groups working undercover in the locality. Security officers, in return, approve 
of his position as an authority figure, thug and drug dealer. The film portrayed the 
relationship between Hashisha and the senior security officer (responsible for his district) 
that goes through ups and downs throughout the film.  
The second story was that of Nahed, a poor girl that got involved in a sexual 
relationship with Hashisha and became pregnant. When Hashisha rejected Nahed, her 
lovechild using the keyword ‘Come back heen maysara’ or ‘whenever I have means to 
afford our living’, Nahed escaped the house of her mother and her step father that keeps 
harassing her relentlessly. She abandoned her son and fled to Alexandria in an attempt to 
start living on her own. Given her status of poverty and illiteracy, Nahed worked as a 
peddler until an old lady has pity on her when she saw her sleeping in the street, and took 
her into her apartment which had a sea view in Alexandria. After the sudden death of the 
lady, Nahed had to go back to the street, when the lady’s cruel sons accused her of 
stealing their mother’s properties. During her constant attempts to find an alternative, 
Nahed was subjected to rape and sexual abuse by almost all the people she encountered 
in her journey (a young gambler and his friends, some drug addicts and a rich 
homosexual woman who offered her to work as her maid). Eventually, Nahed became 
more submissive to practice a sort of masked prostitution and worked for a businessman 
who exploited her body for his business interests.  
  The sex scenes in the film were received with an intense hostility from the 
conservative and religious members of the Egyptian society, particularly those depicting 
a homosexual relationship between two women, rape scene, and sexual promiscuity 
among ashwaiyyat inhabitants and street children. Islamic preachers in Al Azhar’s 
Supreme Council of Islamic Affairs127
                                                     
127 . Al Azhar was founded in 975 as a mosque and university. It is the chief centre of 
 and members of the Egyptian parliament 
Arabic literature and 
Sunni Islamic learning. It is associated with Al-Azhar supreme council of Islamic affairs. The university's 
mission includes the propagation of Islamic religion and culture. To this end, its Islamic scholars (Ulama) 
have the right to render edicts (fatwas) on disputes submitted to them from all over the Sunni Islamic world 
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demanded the film banned and that Khaled Youssef be charged of ‘assaulting the general 
belief and value system in the Egyptian society after performing a scene of ‘lesbianism’ 
between the actresses Ghada Abd Al Razik and Somayya Al Khashab’128
“Prostitution, incest, adultery, illegal pregnancy, rape, hash and cocaine, 
homosexuality among women, all in one place. This film lacks only an 
earthquake, a flood and a volcano. It is a black document, no, it is sheer 
blackness. And mark that, every five minutes the police attacks a certain site of 
prostitution, gambling or drug dealing. It is a very exaggerated representation of 
reality. In addition, this film was supposed to be classified ‘to watch with parental 
guidance’. The head of the censorship apparatus on artistic productions should 
quit his work. I am a liberal man, but I wouldn’t allow my son to watch two 
women sleeping together with twenty pounds”
.  
 In the TV program “Al Kahira el youm” (Cairo Today), directly after the public 
screening of Heen Maysara, the prominent Egyptian anchor Amr Adib interviewed 
Youssef and the actors in the film. Amr introduced the episode with the following 
speech: 
129
Similarly, in her TV program “The Difficult Choice”
 
130
                                                                                                                                                              
regarding proper conduct for 
 on the official state TV, 
the journalist Lamis Al Hadidy (the wife of Amr Adib) attacked Youssef aggressively 
asking him: “Would you dare taking your son to watch this movie and see promiscuity, 
homosexuality and ashwaiyyat?!! … ” Youssef answered: “Definitely, I took him 
already, these scenes are essential because the main story is about how those people 
capitalize on their body to earn their living as they have nothing else.” Youssef was 
referring to the scene between the two actresses when Nahed said: “Don’t you have but 
my body to take advantage of, men and women?” The lady replied: “And do you have 
something else to be desired dear?” It is noteworthy that the scene was quiet short (40 
seconds) and did not contain any explicit exposure of the actresses’ bodies. 
Muslim individuals or societies. Al-Azhar also trains Egyptian government 
appointed preachers in proselytization (da'wa). However, in the recent years, the council scholars interfered 
heavily in judging and evaluating artistic productions especially in cinema. 
128 . The website “Aks El Seir”: 
http://www.aksalser.com/?page=view_news&id=24793128973a465f1930eed64f4ed57b&ar=491652793 
Accessed in December 2008. 
129 . “Cairo today”, a daily talk show, presented on Orbit satellite network, an Arab TV station. 
130 . “The difficult choice”, TV program presented on the Egyptian official television by the journalist 
Lamis Al Hadidy, Channel One, in September 27th, 2008. 
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The way Adib and Al Hadidy ironically phrased their argument on the one hand, 
and the adoption of such an extremist hostile discourse by religious and juridical 
institutions on the other reflected facets of the intense debate raised by Heen Maysara 
when screened in Egyptian theatres. Moreover, they exposed a deeper level of aversion 
and anxiety towards the issues disclosed by the film and represented as part of the social 
reality in ashwaiyyat.  
It is noteworthy that the third plot line in the film was the story of Nahed and 
Hashisha’s lovechild that was sold to a well-to-do upper middle class family where the 
woman was unable to get pregnant. The family got rid of the boy as soon as the lady 
became pregnant. The boy grew up as a homeless street child living with a big group of 
children in the dusky foul corners of the immense city of Cairo. One of the hot points of 
the debate about Heen Maysara was its scrutiny of the details of life of the group of adult 
homeless boys and girls mapping out a picture of sexual promiscuity and beggary usually 
met with disgust and rejection by members of upper classes. Ayman (the name given to 
the boy) was claimed to be the father of another love child of one of the girls in the 
group. After a quarrel about the real father, Ayman accepts the responsibility and decides 
to take his new family and leave Cairo to try earning his living in a more merciful place. 
Heen Maysara ends with Hashisha, Nahed and Ayman taking the same train, without 
meeting or knowing each other, heading towards a gloomy future that awaits them after 
escaping the pitiless capital. Khaled Youssef wrote the following apology on the final 
titer: “I apologize for the people if I could not present their life as I saw it… Actually I 
found the reality too cruel to be presented on the screen.”  
However, this tragic view of the reality survived in ashwaiyyat did not appeal to a 
wide range of critics and audience. Tarek Mosbah, critic and journalist, viewed the film 
as based on a ‘totalitarian’ idea that dominated the whole plot and its diverse stories: 
poverty and coercion results in hero necessarily becoming a religious extremist and the 
heroin choosing moral deviation: “The film guides the viewer to one vision which is the 
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director’s, and deploys the human suffering of those people in a vulgar commercial 
context (referring to sex scenes and homosexual relationships).”131
In one of the collective gatherings I held to examine people’s interpretations after 
watching the film, Sherif Amer, an Egyptian engineer (26 years old), commented: “I 
don’t like this dramatization by Khaled Youssef, I do agree that those people are really 
poor and that the police is brutal. Yet, I would not believe this homeless boy admitting 
being the father of the baby and refusing to repeat the cycle as his parents did.” Sherif’s 
impression about the idealization of some characters in the film and the exaggerated 
victimization of them is not understandable for May El Sayed (25 years old engineer), 
another member of the group who reacted promptly: “But we cannot deny a feeling of 
shame after watching the film, this is the reality, naked and painful, and we do nothing 
for them.” In Al Riyad newspaper, the critic Samir Farid stated: “This is one of the best 
films of Youssef, and this is the real status in Egypt”
  
132. The famous director, Daod Abd 
El Sayed, who previously presented ashwaiyyat and poor classes in two masterpieces Al 
Kit Kat (1991) and Sarek El Farah (The Thief of Happiness- 1994), agreed with Farid: 
“Regardless of the artistic quality, it is important to see again films that treat such critical 
causes and crises survived by the Egyptian society instead of films without any value”133
From another perspective, the film may have gained such sympathy because it 
tackled a topic that in recent years already pervaded Egyptian media stories and articles. 
Many writers and researchers described a certain commonality between the reality that 
the middle and upper classes survive in their localities and that of ashwaiyy quarters. The 
scenes of chaotic practices and the informal law and thuggery were part of lived reality in 
contemporary Egyptian society regardless of the class position or the economic situation. 
Diaa Rashwan
.  
134
“Tracing the current accidents of the business upper class in Egypt in recent years, 
demonstrate that we are facing a quiet similar behavioral model to that in 
ashwaiyyat. The only difference is the amount of wealth and the places and 
 argued: 
                                                     
131 . Al Riyad newspaper, January 8th, 2008. 
132 . Ibid, 2008. 
133 . A. F. P. (Agence France- presse),  January 7th, 2008. 
134 . P. H. D. Diaa Rashwan, researcher in Al Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies.  
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relations involved in those incidents. Drug trade, drug consumption, hiring 
baltaggiya (thugs) or bodyguards, illegal acquisition of state properties, sexual 
violations and perversions, polygamy and physical aggression not ending by 
killing for vengeance and other ‘ghastly’ scenes. They all look analogous are 
common to those who lie at the bottom of the society and those who monopolize 
the top. The difference between what happens in the bottom and what happens on 
the top is that the former looks primitive and crude without make- up or 
beautification, all the illegal or criminal behaviors are obvious, while the latter is 
always bound by secrecy behind the fences of the closed areas inhabited by upper 
class members”135
 Galal Amin postulates different reasons rendering the Egyptian middle class less 
distinguishable from the lower classes. Among these reasons, as Amin argued, are the 
high unemployment rates, diminishing numbers of Egyptian labor in Gulf countries since 
1986, vanishing state subsidization and expenditure following agreements with the World 
Bank in 1991 and increased rates of consumption among classes
.  
 
What Rashwan identified is consistent with a vague sense of fear that prevails 
among some Egyptian intellectuals and lay people about the shrinkage of the middle class 
and the widening gap between classes. In one of my interviews, Ahmed Fawzy, a young 
Egyptian film maker (31 years old), admitted this fear:  
 “The middle class nowadays is living a nightmare, a man works in a bank for               
twenty hours to be able to buy an apartment and improve his social status, yet 
the chaotic rules of the market make him always insecure no matter what his 
capabilities are, he wants to escape his present conditions, it’s decomposing 
and you have to choose, to ascend or descend, this insecurity is now 
preoccupying middle class minds”. 
 
136
“One walks the streets, uses the various transport means, goes to cafes and 
restaurants and universities, sees young boys and girls in their schools and 
walking by the Nile, and one sees nothing but ‘middle class’. No one looks 
distinguished from the other from a class perspective, except for poor exhausted 
peddlers, skinny security officers, or poor farmers. Except for these examples, all 
the rest look ‘middle class’. The question is whether this class disappeared or 
dissolved in the lower classes that both of them form a big amalgamated mass 
struggling with the same problems and having the same hopes (or rather having 
. Amin describes the 
middle class predicament as follows: 
                                                     
135 . Rashwan, Diaa. 2008. “The Swinging Egypt between ashwaiyyat of The Bottom and ashwaiyyat of 
The Top”, Al Masry Al Youm, 16 August. P 15. 
136 . Amin, Galal. 1995. Egypt’s Economic Predicament: A Study in the Interaction of External Pressure, 
Political Folly and Social Tension in Egypt 1960- 1990. Published by BRILL, 1995 
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lost the same hopes). It is now very difficult to categorize them according to the 
old classification”.137
“The traditional view is that such a pervert and disfigured social model reins the 
Ashwaiyyat at the bottom of society, but when it prevails at the top of it, this 
means that the whole society is moving towards a tremendous disaster. However, 
the rapidity and danger of this disaster increase when the middle class (always the 
guardian of the stability of the society) had reached a complete decline in all the 
economic, social, cultural and moral dimensions of the word. This decline 
happened after the transformations carried out by the political regime under the 
leadership of the business class due to a set of powerful knock outs that 
dismantled its internal coherence”
 
 
Amin with such a sorrowful article adopts a classical middle class discourse that 
has dominated the Egyptian media over the last ten years. This discourse links the 
crumpling of a threatened middle class to the broader collapse of the ambitions of the 
national welfare project and modernity (see chapter three). However, while stressing the 
importance of the middle class and glorifying its achievements, middle class intellectuals 
cannot hide an envious appreciation of the upper classes and a deeply seated despise for 
the poor people dwelling in ashwaiyyat. Rashwan’s language is but one illustration: 
138
Farha Ghannam, in her fieldwok in Zawiyya
. 
 
139
Loathe for ashwaiyyat residents was tackled by Heen Maysara in a climactic 
point where the anxiety of the educated and supposedly privileged middle class is 
extensively provoked by the economic difficulties.  Their reactions, whether positive or 
, maps out how the middle and 
upper classes view the newly constructed urban expansions of Cairo and their inhabitants. 
She describes how they perceive them as remote places housing drug dealers, criminals 
and trouble makers. Ashwaiyyat in Ghannam’s work, are publicly seen as places lacking 
the authenticity of the old Cairo quarters and the luxury of its rich ones. They are 
considered outcasts on the urban landscape and rather representing as she depicts 
extensions of the ‘rifi (rural) subculture’ that bears attachments to the local custom in the 
first place. 
                                                     
137 . Galal Amin’s article in Al Masry Al Youm newspaper, in August 19th, 2008. 
138 . Rashwan, Diaa. 2008. “The Swinging Egypt between Ashwai’iyat of The Bottom and Ashwai’iyat of 
The Top”, Al Masry Al Youm, 16 August. 
139 . Ghannam, Farha. 2002. Remaking the Modern: Space, Relocation, and the Politics of Identity in a 
Global Cairo. Berkeley: University of California Press.  
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negative, can be read as expressive of how they see themselves and how they relate to the 
‘others’ dwelling in ashwaiyyat, while haunted by obsessions of ascension and decline. 
A conversation between Adib in “Cairo today” and Wafaa Amer, one of the 
actresses in Heen Maysara, bespeaks the distance between the representation and the 
venture of the public gaze of the middle class towards the poor: 
Wafaa: I exposed myself to the sun, I acted without make-up, to look like ‘those 
people’. I cut my nails for my hands to look like their hands in reality. 
Amr (mocking): Anyways, we could ‘smell’ the reality on our seats in cinema 
theatres. 
Wafaa: No, smell is not part of my performance, I used perfumes though… 
 
4.3. “El Lemby”: Against the rhetoric 
 
Unlike Heen Maysara, the film makers of El Lemby announced from the very first 
scenes that they will make fun of the rhetoric of the traditional middle class movies140
Regardless of the impossibility in real life of choosing this song as one to reiterate 
while going back home stoned at night (given its difficult classical Arabic poetry, 
character of the subject, and El Lemby’s impaired pronunciation), the film-makers 
insisted on invoking the song directly after the humiliating chat with the officer who 
kicked El Lemby out of the street of a descent quarter.  “The emergence of El Lemby was 
against the moralities of the middle class who worships superman and positive heroes” 
. 
After a long cynical chat with a police officer asking to see his ID, El Lemby gets back to 
his district, stoned as usual, singing with apparent incoherence: “All the people stood up 
witnessing how I found the bases of glory by my own… “, the famous verse of the poem 
“Egypt speaks about herself” by acclaimed poet Hafez Ibrahim. The Egyptian legendary 
singer Um Kulthum sang this poem in October 30th 1952, marking the beginning of a 
new era of independence of the Egyptian state. Since then, this song has been played in 
all national celebrations signifying the values of independence and liberation while 
referencing to a glorious past and a promising future. 
                                                     
140 . See Walter Armbrust description of the main themes about middle class in Egyptian cinema in chapter 
three.  
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wrote Wael Abd Elfattah in ‘Soot El Ummah’ newspaper141
In 2002, the actor Mohamed Saad (1965- present) starred El Lemby in which he 
presented a caricaturist profile of a poor ashwaiyy quarter resident who cannot find 
appropriate work and keeps searching for a venue to make money and pay a debt of 
another resident. The film was the biggest box- office of the year and continued to be 
shown in movie theatres for seventeen consecutive weeks with unprecedented revenues 
of twenty two million Egyptian pounds
 analyzing the phenomena of 
new cinema stars in the contemporary Egyptian cinema. Abd Elfattah was referring to the 
simple story about a frustrated man trying desperately to earn his living through minor 
jobs (renting bicycles for tourists in Sharm El Sheikh and selling lamb liver sandwiches 
in the street) and never succeeding. The perpetual failure of El Lemby was the main 
theme that substituted the conventional theme of ascension that dominates the stories of 
the Egyptian cinema and particularly those films starred by middle and upper class 
heroes. Ahmed Fawzy (29 years old, film-maker) thinks that Mohamed Saad had a class 
consciousness that disappeared soon after El Lemby (part 1). Fawzy argues: “He ended up 
becoming rich at the end of his movies and having a nice house and a beautiful wife, like 
80- 90% of the movies nowadays, the ascension theme is indispensable. The remaining 
10% used to present the absurdity theme like El Lemby” 
142
 Safinaz Kazem
. El Lemby had a distorted linguistic structure 
and a creepy pronunciation of words in addition to the constantly stoned mannerisms due 
to his continuous consumption of hash (always available in his quarter). All these features 
were deployed to present a heavily sarcastic comedy that set new records in the number 
of its cinema viewers. 
143
                                                     
141 . Wael Abd Al Fattah’s article: “The making of stars in Egypt”. Published in Soot Al Ummah newspaper. 
August 5th, 2002. P12. 
142 . Hammond, Andrew 2007. Popular Culture in the Arab World: Arts, Politics and the Media. Cairo: 
American University Press in Cairo. Pp. 137- 158. 
143 . An Egyptian journalist and critique. She wrote in Al Hilal magazine issue in September 2002 an article 
about “El Lemby” claiming it is one of the best Egyptian movies along history!!. 
 
 writing in Al Hilal magazine in September 2002 described El 
Lemby as a popular hero who used a language that expressed his relation to the difficult 
circumstances and the daily oppression that he faced by bureaucrats and police officers in 
his continuous attempts to find a job. El Lemby’s language had an unusual logic where 
the words are detached from their original contexts to get allocated in totally different 
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context for sarcastic purposes. The same phenomenon was described in Togo by C. 
Toulabor in his study about ‘political derision’ in 1986144
“He shows how, under one- party rule, citizens developed ways of separating 
words or phrases from their conventional meanings and using them in quite other 
sense. He illustrates how they thus built a whole vocabulary, equivocal and 
ambiguous, parallel to the official discourse”
. Mbembe cites Toulabor 
explaining the phenomenon: 
145
However, El Lemby succeeded in all movie theatres including those in Cairo’s 
huge and glamorous shopping malls where viewers are mostly upper middle class 
youngsters who probably never had been to slums and ashwaiyy quarters before. The 
majority of Egyptian intellectuals, artists and media professionals heavily criticized the 
film and accused Saad and the director of the film Wael Ehsan of spoiling young 
generations, corrupting the Arabic language and misrepresenting social moralities and 
ideals
  
 
 According to Kazem, El Lemby talked incoherently and uses vague sounds to 
deal with the fragmentation of his reality. Incoherence and vagueness of language were 
not only symbolic of a cynical attitude but also verbalized the high sense of bitterness and 
absurdity dominating the dramatic situations. The hero in the film was living a messy life 
devoid of meaning and achievement inside his impoverished hectic quarter. Deprived 
from the basic needs of housing, work and dignified life, El Lemby, in Kazem’s view, 
symbolized the hurtful case of a majority of the poor and marginalized Egyptians imbued 
with resentment and repressed anger.  
146. Tarek Al Shenawi147
                                                     
144 . Toulabor, C. 1986. “LE TOGO SOUS ÉYADÉMA”. KARTHALA. 
145 . Mbembe, Achille. 2001. “The Aesthetics of Vulgarity” In On the Postcolony. Berkeley: University of 
California Press. P. 105. 
146 . Different newspapers’ writings criticized “El Lemby” as part of the revival of the Egyptian cinema 
with ‘low- culture’ blockbuster comedies but that neverthless had  tapped into a desire among the 
burgeoning younger generation for new faces and films that deal with the realities of today’s youth 
(Hammond 2007: 139). 
147 . Personal interview with Al Shenawi, October 2008. 
 the well known cinema critic asserts: 
“From my experience and my very intimate connection and loyalty to the art of 
cinema, I feel guilty calling ‘El Lemby’ a film, and despite that I can see the 
societal need that brought this character to stardom, However, I would not merge 
both things and admit that it is a good film” 
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 Interviews and conversations of viewers produced similar reactions: “There is no film, it 
is a sequence of disconnected scenes meant only to make the audience laugh” commented 
Myvel Seddik148
 “El Lemby may be a bad movie from technical point of view, but I am definitely 
with that, it is impossible to be dramatically logical in such a film, he was 
rebelling against everything even the idea of the dramatic sequence itself, his idea 
was that all these clichés are nonsense, we cannot judge El Lemby from this 
perspective, it has other aesthetic values. I think that this vision happened 
unconsciously and if it was planned consciously it would be a great film that 
theorizes the absurdity of our reality, characters who behave without logic, the 
soundtrack that does not relate to the scenes; but it is more likely to believe that it 
is a mere commercial exploitation of the previous success of El Lemby character 
in Al Nazer.”
 (27 years old) in a personal interview, refusing any considerate 
descriptions about the film as representing a bitter social reality. Saif Salah (31 years old) 
disagrees totally with this opinion during an accidental conversation about the movie: 
 
149
If we contemplate the set of opinions and reactions to Heen Maysara and El 
Lemby, we can deduce that most part of the debate was related to their conformity to the 
social reality in contemporary Egypt, not only in poor quarters but also in the supposedly 
well-off ones. And though media productions are usually received as imaginary 
representation of the reality not reality itself, the provoked public opinion could not help 
getting engaged with the assumptions implied in both films. The receptive audience (in 
my sample) spontaneously tended to sum up their reactions to the films by stating to what 
extent they are real and to what degree such precariousness is prevalent in the Egyptian 
society altogether. The researcher Amr El Shboky
 
 
150
“When an entire country turns to be a meeting point of ashwaiyyat, no distinction 
between rich and poor, educated and illiterate, a refined or a poor quarter, the 
whole people lives in mobile ashwaiyyat; in houses, streets, work and even 
beaches, it becomes difficult for this ashwaiyy (disorganized) country to escape 
any sort of crises, especially that its capability of contrivance is fed up since we 
 goes further in affirming that the 
whole society is facing decline always pointing out ashwaiyyat as the bad model that all 
society joins: 
                                                     
148 . Myvel Seddik, hardware engineer in a multinational corporate, in a structured interview in September 
2007. 
149 . Conversation with Saif Salah, Egyptian bank accountant, in November 2007. 
150 .. Amr Al Shobky. Researcher in Al Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies. 
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are very close- much more than the state imagines- to the end of a phase of the 
affirmation of chaos and the absence of law”151
 
.  
 
This anxious tone of Al Shobky affirms again the fears that prevailed among the 
Egyptian middle class. My argument is that films like El Lemby and Heen Maysara could 
be viewed as a reaction to these fears. The middle class – represented in both producers 
and consumers – tries to reset the distance that separates them from ashwaiyyat through 
this fear.  Egyptian middle class viewers project their obsessions about decline and 
joining poor classes on the ashwaiyyat characters presented in cinema. The ritual of 
watching cinema as evidenced in this case implies processes of classification and 
exclusion. The middle class re-defines the poor people as something to which it does not 
belong. The de-humanization of the poor in ashwaiyyat by turning them into ‘creatures’ 
that behave, move and talk in a completely different way than ‘ours’ affirms their 
claimed threat (see Khaled Youssef’s caption p. 60) and legitimizes the social exclusion 
practiced against them.  
I also argue that the hegemony of the state in contemporary Egypt, under the 
current rule of Hosni Mubarak (1981-present), propels the internal dialogue of fear 
among the middle class and enhances its rush to rearrange the class map in Egypt. The 
social subconscious, eager to achieve this rearrangement, is translated on cinema screens. 
Characterizing and synthesizing the poor as the rejected ‘other’ in El Lemby and Heen 
Maysara, sensitizes the middle class against the naturalization of the threat of poverty 
and collapse. Moreover, it guards the levels of social denial of the prevalent violence and 
the disorganization that infiltrate the comportment of the middle and upper classes in a 
very similar fashion to ashwaiyyat (see Rashwan and Shobky observations detailed 
earlier). In what follows, I investigate how these arguments are realized in both films and 
how the influence of the sociopolitical context and the middle class predicament 
contributed to their making and reception. 
 
 
                                                     
151 . Al Shobky, Amr. 2008. “Egyptian Observations”, Al Masry Al Youm, 14 August. 
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4.4. Social Exclusion and Representing the De-politicized 
 
“In the old days, a very big battle occurred in the country, during the central 
security forces rebel, the tanks (Dababat said the wrong way Dabdabat) were 
in the streets, and they announced a curfew (Hazr tagawwol said Haz’ 
tagawwol to mean ‘straining’), your brother didn’t care and went down the 
street , me too went to watch this haz’ tagawwol, we walked in the streets in 
the middle of dabdabat, nobody asked us who you are or even felt our 
presence, your brother said: What is this? We don’t exist or we are invisible? It 
seems Adel that we came to this world and we’ll leave it unnoticed. I don’t 
know why I had this urge to have children, I swear (to divorce my wife) I am a 
donkey, thanks god the doctor told me I am infertile, Would I have children to 
come to the world and leave it unnoticed?! Forget about it… “ 
 
Fathi, the friend of Adel Hashisha in Heen Maysara, was narrating his story to 
Hashisha by the Nile after making sure that his infertility disorder is untreatable. Fathi 
kept denying this fact for a long time, living for years with his wife and accusing her of 
being the reason behind not having kids. Fathi even married another younger wife 
claiming that he is going to have a ‘twin’. Fathi who smokes hash unremittingly and has a 
distorted pronunciation resembles El Lemby in many features. The tonal shift that Fathi 
makes in his pronunciation of the complicated terms used in the official discourse (like 
Hazr Tagawwol) to change their meanings to metaphors, always obsessed with body 
orifices, ignites popular laughter for their implicit criticism of the commandment as 
Mbembe states: 
“Beyond specifically the mouth, belly and phallus, the body is the principal locale 
of the idioms and fantasies used in depicting power. If indeed it is the festivities 
and celebrations that are the vehicles for giving expression to the commandment 
and for staging its displays of magnificence and prodigality, then the body in 
question is first a body that eats and drinks, and second a body that is open in both 
ways: hence the significance given to the orifices, and the central part they play in 
people’s political humor”152
                                                     
152 . Mbembe, Achille. 2001. “The Aesthetics of Vulgarity” In On the Postcolony. Berkeley: University of 
California Press. P. 107. 
 
 
 
 
73 
 
 The similarity in language between Fathi and El Lemby is one of the features of a 
profound sentiment of meaninglessness and disintegration. Wael Abd Elfattah describes 
El Lemby as a defeated hero: 
 “Nothing makes him a hero but his repetitive defeats in life. Not an ‘anti- hero’ 
like Robert De Nero in “Taxi driver”, El Lemby and his resemblances are heroes 
without heroism, they would not support fake moralities, their values are harsh, 
everyday without big ideas, sensual without heavy mentality”153
“He manages to abolish and maintain distance at one and the same time, since he 
is both remote and close, the obverse and the reverse, that ‘something’ that is 
present for us not only because it is displayed and we experience it- we 
experience the thing- but, more decisively, because it is the very thing of our 
experience: tangible, palpable, and visible, but at the same time secret and distant- 
in short, a ‘non- localized universal presence”.
  
 
Abd Elfattah presumes that this is the theme that the audience liked much: 
“Seeing themselves in a mirror and rediscovering the image lost in media representations 
that do not usually admit but ‘cultivated’ images about the poor”. Many writers and 
analysts were preoccupied with the secret of the huge success of both characters and their 
great appeal to the audience. And like Abd Elfattah, many of them admitted that audience 
sympathy is due to a mysterious feeling that these representations could grasp the core of 
this audience’s behavior: “You know what, I feel El Lemby is not like real life, he’s too 
naïve and kind, and the film is very abstract, his incoherence and disorganization is more 
of a simulation of the mental status of the whole country”, commented Saif Salah after 
the collective group watching of El Lemby (part 1). In his scrutiny of caricaturist 
representations in Cameroon, Achille Mbembe explains how the audience experiences 
such a moment of empathy with characters in representations: 
154
                                                     
153 . Wael Abd Al Fattah. 2002. “The making of stars in Egypt”. Soot Al Ummah newspaper. August 5th, 
2002.  
154 . Mbembe, Achille. 2001. “The Thing and its Doubles” In On the Postcolony. Berkeley: University of 
California Press. P. 153. 
 
 
 
The feelings of being marginalized and unaccountable described by Fathi in the 
scene by the Nile are very common with El Lemby. After one of the attacks when the 
police crushed his cart for selling lamb liver sandwiches, El Lemby told his friends while 
smoking hash: 
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“Why I wasn’t born a chicken? At least I would only lay eggs, but you know what, 
even if I was a hen there still will be an unbearable cock who gives me hard time, 
like this one who smashed my cart today, I kept screaming and begging him ‘please 
sir, I will lose everything, and he didn’t even reply” 
 
El Lemby and Fathi in many respects were a prototype of the ‘common person’ in Egypt; 
vulgarly carved from day to day by the harshness of the situation, humiliated by the 
police, haunted by the search for subsistence and the fear of having nothing. This 
prototype is not necessarily related to being in ashwaiyyat, poor, or uneducated as the 
public discourse tends to correlate them. Farha Ghannam denies this correlation in her 
account about Al Zawiyya155
“There are families with relatively high income, especially those whose members 
are skilled workers or who work in oil- producing countries, and there are 
unskilled workers with little income who can hardly sustain their families. A man 
may, for example, work during the day as a teacher in a professional school where 
he earns around one hundred Egyptian pounds per month and work as house 
painter in the evening, which earns him more than two hundred pounds”
 in Egypt: 
156
This description of the locality considered an ashwaiyyat befits many traditional 
middle class families in old Cairo like Mounira and Sayyeda Zeinab. Similarly, the level 
of education does not guarantee that the educated middle class would not speak or behave 
like El Lemby: “My friend with a bachelor of commerce from the University of 
Alexandria speaks exactly like El Lemby”, said Sherif Amer (in the gathering to watch 
the movie). Bryan Bary
. 
 
157
“Social exclusion is a distinguishable phenomenon from poverty and economic 
inequality. However, there is a correlation between the distribution of income and 
social exclusion though not a direct one, because this relation emerges through 
surviving a common fate and participating in the public institutions. The individual 
income’s relation to his/ her ability of participation is dependent on the extent to 
 asserts that social exclusion cannot only be premised on 
income or education levels but is also related to several parameters of inclusion within 
the public frameworks of approval and participation: 
                                                     
155 . Al Zawiyya was established in the seventies to reallocate people from Bulaq occurred. Al Zawiyya was 
claimed to be a Ashwai’y zone where fanatics  formed militant groups which resulted finally into series of 
sectarian clashes in 1976. 
156 . Ghannam, Farha 2002. Remaking the Modern: Space, Relocation, and the Politics of Identity in a 
Global Cairo. Berkeley: University of California Press. 2002. 
157. Bary, Bryan. 2002. “Social exclusion and social isolation and the distribution of income” In 
Understanding Social Exclusion. Hills, John, Julian Le Grand and David Piachaud (eds.). Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 2002. 
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which all people profit from these institutions for free and with big support from 
the part of the state”158
Bary’s analysis challenges us to perceive social exclusion of certain social strata as 
more general phenomenon, where state policies and government practices are at stake. 
Bary identifies social exclusion as “the case of an individual in the society dwelling in a 
certain region but for reasons beyond his/ her control cannot participate in the everyday 
activities of citizens in his society while he/she is positive in the desire to participate”
.  
 
159
“The ashwaiyyat are not simply exclusive poverty belts but the home of many 
middle-class urbanites, professionals and civil servants. What perhaps may breed 
lawlessness is not the cultural essentials of residents, but, rather, the consequences 
of their being perceived as outsiders and of the density and lack of spatial clarities 
of the communities. An outsider community, even if located in the heart of a city, 
by definition lacks street names, house numbers, maps, a police presence, paved 
roads for police cars and, thus, state control”
. 
Assef Bayat asserts that in the Egyptian context, ashwaiyyat cannot be simply classified 
as spaces that harbor only the poor: 
160
In her study about the film “Salam Bombay”
 
 
161
This argument may partly interpret how the representation of the ashwaiyyat 
residents in El Lemby and Heen Maysara tackled the issue of social exclusion that 
encompassed not only the lower classes who suffer from the lack of education and skills, 
but also the middle class that struggles with the implementation of the neoliberal 
 Salwa Bakr argues that the 
implementation of the capitalist modes of production in third world countries in 
particular, neglects planning for connecting economic production to people’s actual 
needs. This discrepancy results in the social exclusion and marginalization of the human 
resources that exceed the requirements of the production system. This group of people, as 
Bakr states, “does not possess any skills or expertise that qualifies them to participate in 
public affairs or public decisions or even in the individual daily affairs that matter for 
them”.  
                                                     
158 . Ibid, P.102. 
159 . Ibid, P. 46. 
160 . Bayat, Asef and Eric Denis 2000. “Who is Afraid of Ashwaiyyat? Urban Change and Politics in 
Egypt” in Environment and Urbanization. 12; 185.    
161 . Bakr, Salwa. 1998. “Salam Bombay: On underdevelopment and desultoriness” in Alif ( Journal of 
Comparative Poetics). No 18. P. 125. 
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economic programs in Egypt (See Chapter 3). This representation of the marginalized 
stimulated the audience to re-think the traits of the ashwaiyyat residents, as presented in 
the films, within the framework of social exclusion. These characteristics could be 
summed up in the following: lack of skills and expertise in any of the fields of production 
or social services, absence from all sorts of economic activity, being invisibly on the 
national/public income charts, and disengagement from all public institutions like 
education and law. These criteria, in my view, reduce the relation between this group of 
people and the state to the limited boundaries of the policing and disciplining institutions 
as criminality turns to be the only linkage left between “those people” and the civic arena 
surrounding them 
 
4.5. The Egyptian State and Disseminating the Discourse of Absurdity 
 
When we contemplate some changes in state/citizen relation under Mubarak we can 
better grasp mechanisms of exclusion from the social and political public spheres. This 
exclusion can be interpreted as part of techniques of the state aiming at maintaining its 
hegemony on the political life in Egypt and excluding its opponents from the circles of 
power that influence the decision-making processes. In this respect, it would be important 
to follow the study of Michel-Rolph Trouillot162
“Put thus, it becomes immediately apparent that the differences that distinguished 
the regimes of the two Duvaliers from those that preceded them were not merely 
quantitative. Sometime around 1961- 1965, the accumulation of these differences 
and the extent of their growth transformed differences of degree into structural 
 about the way the Duvaliers in Haiti 
solidified their dictatorship between 1957- 1964. Trouillot distinguishes between a 
conventional dictatorship and an unconventional dictatorship that deploys different 
mechanisms that escalate its abuse of power to unprecedented limits. He identifies a set 
of processes that induced a qualitative change in the nature of authoritarianism. I rely on 
his analysis to interpret transformations in the state mechanisms of action in Egypt (2002- 
2008): 
                                                     
162 . Trouillot, Michel-Rolph. 1990. “State against Nation” In Haiti: State against Nation, the Origins and 
Legacy of Duvalierism. New York: Monthly Review Press. Pp. 163- 185. 
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innovations. The state had broken through the culturally specific limits of 
authoritarianism.”163
The first procedure is the intentional destruction of civil society institutions that 
achieved a certain amount of credibility and independence before 2005, a process I 
discussed in chapter three. The Egyptian regime following the emergence of some active 
and influential social movements in 2005 embarked on a series of measures of hostility 
and aggression towards the civil society institutions like political parties, independent 
social movements, NGOs, human rights activists, media channels and personnel and even 
independent intellectuals. The Egyptian regime also managed to act on the symbolic level 
by disseminating an unsympathetic tone about its opponents, claiming they were agents 
of the US or were dependent on Western funding and agenda
 
 
By “the culturally specific limits of authoritarianism” Trouillot means a set of 
implicit social codes that influence and control state’s decision to use its power or 
legitimate violence in a traditional dictatorship. Violating these codes bears a symbolic 
value indicating that the state is going beyond the limits by its dictators. This misuse of 
power in contemporary Egypt was intentionally planned and carried out, in my view, 
through two main procedures. 
164
“The formalization of the crisis implied the institutionalization of the split 
between political and civil society: The chief of the state swallowed up the entire 
executive branch, the executive engulfed the state and the state engulfed the 
nation. Each process occurred in part because of the weakness of the national 
institutions and the lack of vision of the so- called political elites”
. The regime benefited as 
well from its heritage of a privileged autocratic class and its bureaucratic agents who 
were distributed to combat the growing influence of civil society. The Egyptian state 
succeeded in propagating a sense of despair about potential reform, as it proved an 
indisputable ability to polarize the nation into allies and enemies of the regime. Trouillot 
scrutinizes a similar process in Haiti: 
165
Such polarization processes were regularly carried out by attracting the political 
and intellectual elite in Egypt to join the ruling NDP (National Democratic Party) and 
. 
 
                                                     
163 . Ibid, 165. 
164 . International Crisis Group  2005. Reforming Egypt: in Search of a Strategy. 
165 . Ibid, 178. 
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portraying the opposition parties as weak and non-influential opponents.166 The state 
autocrats and the security apparatus were allowed to commit violent acts of detention and 
physical torture towards prominent symbols of the Egyptian opposition like Ayman 
Nour167 and Abd Elhalim Kandil168
“The principal organizers came from the parasitic strata attached to the dominant 
alliance: Professionals, artisans, petty bureaucrats. But the ranks of the ton-ton 
makeout, as well as those of the civil militia, included members from all social 
classes. The active participation of wide range of the population won at least a 
minimum of social acceptance for the totalitarian code of state violence. Few 
people may have been ready to proclaim their willingness to commit any crime on 
behalf of the regime, but there were enough to act as if they were- and enough to 
replace them when they themselves disappeared”
.  
This behavior, in my judgment, intensified the internal social conflict between 
members of the civil society on the one hand, and state agents distributed in several 
sectors and in innumerable institutions on the other. The Egyptian state turned its 
monopoly of the use of legitimate violence to a quotidian practice that state 
representatives in their respective sites were allowed to use against other citizens. The 
legitimization of violence as non-political action on part of the state, but rather accepting 
violence as social and as occurring on daily basis, created conflicting social groups and 
nurtured a one-to-one violent behavior in daily life. Trouillot explains that the 
maintenance of such a state of generalized violence requires a massive mobilization of 
the regime’s allies in the different sectors: 
169
  The process of separating the social from the political authorized individual 
violence and jeopardized the burgeoning democratic steps of the Egyptian civil society. 
Moreover, it consolidated the transformation of state-citizen relationship into one that is 
. 
 
                                                     
166 . International Crisis Group  2005. Reforming Egypt: in Search of a Strategy. 
167 . Nour is an Egyptian liberal political activist, lawyer and journalist. In 2000, he founded  Al Ghad 
(tomorrow) oppositional party  and was one of the prominent competitors of president Mubarak in the 
presidential elections 2005. He was sentenced five years in a case of forgery of the official papers of his 
party. The verdict raised a strong public debate with suspicions of being an act of vengeance and 
humiliation from the part of the regime.  
168 . Kandil is an Egyptian nationalist journalist and a member of the Egyptian Movement for change 
(Kefaya).  He is known as the first journalist to criticize the president Mubarak and his son Gamal in person 
and to raise the debate about the succession of Gamal to his father. In 2006, He was kidnapped, beaten and 
left in the desert until rescued accidentally by an army car.  
169. Trouillot, Michel- Rolph. 1990. “State against Nation” In Haiti: State against Nation, the Origins and 
Legacy of Duvalierism. New York: Monthly Review Press. P. 170. 
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premised on citizens being merely subordinate subjects to the state. Subjects became 
depoliticized and disintegrated within the political domain.  
This sort of exclusion encompassed those involved in the political sphere whether 
as activists or subjects affected by decision-making processes. These strata, no matter to 
what class they belonged, struggled with their marginalization from the public sphere 
even though they might not be economically marginalized.  Ahmed Awny in a personal 
interview explained: 
 “There are many issues more pressing than food, water and income, there is an 
actual crisis and suffocating conditions for all the upper class members who live 
an everyday contradiction between their ambitions about an open society and the 
brutally repressive political context, even the American University students who 
are supposedly allowed relative freedom of expression discovered that the 
security forces are awaiting them outside the fences when they were detained and 
beaten during the April 6th strike demonstrations in 2008.” 
 
 
4.6. Inefficiency and Hopelessness 
 
 
The second mechanism that the Mubarak regime deployed to achieve its 
dominance and perpetuate the subordination of its subjects was institutionalizing the 
sense of absurdity in public discourse and the reign of inefficiency in public institutions. 
Horrible accidents proved a substantial failure of the executive and administrative 
sectors.  Many examples could be provided to substantiate the state’s failure in managing 
the severe crises that hit the country lately, the worst of them were the water crises of 
2007 where dwellers of thousands of Egyptian villages and towns were suddenly cut of 
water supply (Al Masry Al Youm, 2007). Al Doweka catastrophe of 2008 was another 
instance, when a cliff collapsed on the eastern edge of Cairo hurling giant boulders on top 
of poor slum dwellings that had been illegally erected, in defiance of constant warnings 
that the site was unsafe. The rock’s slide buried dozens, perhaps hundreds, of residents 
alive. Locals complained that long-promised alternative housing had been given to 
friends and relations of government officials, rather than the needy (The Economist, 
2008). Focusing on Haiti’s Duvallier’s dictatorship Trouillot’s words find resonance int 
eh case of Egypt:  
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“The Duvalierist state had to tolerate inefficiency, irrespective of the intentions or 
competence of individual members of the administration. Inefficiency (not 
incompetence) became the structural precondition for the maintenance of the 
Duvalier’s power”170
“El Lemby and other films of the sort can all be put in the context of ‘looking for 
absurdity’ that dominates the cinema nowadays; characters who say vague words 
yet understandable by the audience, ideas that nobody want to concentrate in, 
crazy acts, funny walks and slap- stick exaggerated voices. These are the real 
films expressing youth views of today. Other silly commercial films that portray a 
falsified bias for causes like patriotism and Arab unity are mere nonsense”
. 
 
Perpetuating inefficiency gradually pervaded the Egyptian public domain 
culminating in apathy and indifference. Poverty and the widening gap between social 
classes became more and more palpable within Cairo’s popular quarters and throughout 
Egypt, despite government pronouncements about the positive progress of economic 
reform: 
“Then, as now, the gap between a very rich few and the teeming mass of have-
nots seemed to yawn ever wider. Then, 2,000 vast estates occupied half of 
Egypt’s fertile land, while millions of illiterate peasants toiled as sharecroppers. 
Today, 44% of Egyptians still count as poor or extremely poor, with some 2.6m 
people so destitute that their entire income cannot cover basic food needs, let 
alone other expenses. Yet ranks of private jets clutter Cairo’s airport. The flower 
arrangements at a recent posh wedding, where whisky flowed and the gowns 
fluttered in from Paris and Milan, were reputed to have cost $60,000 in a country 
where the average wage is less than $100 a month” (The Economist 2008). 
 
Disseminating a general feeling of hopelessness and frustration was an important 
tool to make people surrender to the ruling regime and to accept its absolute domination 
over social and political life. This submissiveness weakened the collective belief in the 
political mechanisms of social change (like democratic elections) and provided the 
regime with prerogative to even survive for longer periods. 
Fathi and El Lemby, in my opinion, could verbalize the state of ‘collective 
marginalization’ that fills the hearts of the Egyptians who watched the films. Khairy 
Bishara elaborates:  
171
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What appeared liberating in the depiction of the daily life of El Lemby is his 
withdrawal and even mockery of all patriotic belonging or nationalistic affiliation, tropes 
usually imposed on the dramatic context in the majority of the Egyptian films. This 
absence of belonging brilliantly grasps the status of non-civic citizens/subjects who have 
no space within public institutions. Heen Maysara and El Lemby provided a 
representation where all the attempts of joining the approved modern state institutions 
seem fake and falsified. The ashwaiyyat resident, in many aspects like the rest of Egypt’s 
residents, deals predominantly with one state institution namely the police. Beside this 
institution, the films portrayed the emptiness of the social space from other venues of 
public participation, a point on which Tarek Al Shinawi elaborates: 
 “This cinema can be easily tied to the contemporary political context that 
announces all the time that there is no collective project for the nation, we had 
socialism then liberalization of economy then nothing, no collective thoughts and 
no collective targets. It is not the cinema that created absurdity and exclusion; it is 
the political situation that created them. All the people need to get rid of any 
meaning to be able to survive and absurdity must prevail in such 
circumstances”172
                                                     
172 . Personal Interview with Al Shinawi in October 2008. 
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Chapter Five 
 
Behind Viewership and Consumption: Class Racism and the ‘Othering’ of the Poor 
 
 5.1. Introduction 
 
 In the last chapter I outlined diverse readings of Heen Maysara and El Lemby 
which contended that the big success they achieved was reflective of a true empathy with 
the characters’ marginalized position. Lack of education and poverty were interpreted as 
symptoms of a more serious social condition where different social strata suffer from the 
haphazardness of the system and the ‘rule of impunity’, in various degrees. The films 
portrayed the societal disintegration and exclusion from the domains that create the 
‘collective sentiment’ and enhance active participation in the public sphere. The sense of 
‘absurdity’ pervading broader sectors beyond the ones represented in the films was 
behind the wide reception and the commotion that accompanied the films’ screenings.  
However, this sense of absurdity produces different reactions than passive 
empathy. The debates accompanying the films demonstrate that despite consensus on the 
systemic nature of disorganization and deterioration on many levels, middle class 
producers and audience reproduce the distinctive boundaries between classes. The 
cultural bourgeoisie establishes a double standard position of reception through which it 
is able to sympathize yet reproduce a ‘class racist’ view of the poor classes. Pierre 
Bourdieu highlights the notion of ‘class racism’ that characterizes the cultural 
bourgeoisie’s practices to distinguish itself from what is perceived as congenitally 
primitive, coarse and vulgar lower classes. In this chapter, I will decipher this duality of 
reception and how the cultural bourgeoisie’s applause or attack on Heen Maysara and El 
Lemby implies dimensions of violence and class racism.  
I rely on Bourdieu’s framework on class position within his analysis of taste and 
how it relates to cultural production. He argues that the social position and authority 
guaranteed to a certain member of society is related to the amount of capital he/she holds. 
This capital is mainly an ‘economic capital’ represented in a ‘cultural capital’ which 
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conveys the share and impact of this person on the dominant culture. Bourdieu postulates 
that the dominant cultural discourses and art reflect the taste of the dominant social 
classes: 
“Taste is a practical mastery of distributions which make it possible to sense or 
intuit what is likely (or not likely) to befall- and therefore to befit- an individual 
occupying a given position in social space. It functions as a sort of social 
orientation, a sense of one’s place”173
Building on this conception of taste, Bourdieu argues that the cultural bourgeoisie 
commands, thanks to its economic capital and its natural disposition (habitus)
. 
 
174, 
symbolic power that determines what sort of art is refined and beautiful according to its 
tendencies and preferences. Gradually, the taste of the cultural bourgeoisie is naturalized 
and infused in the social imaginary as the appropriate form of art regardless of the 
original classification and class categories it represents. According to Bourdieu, such 
naturalization intends to confer legacy and normalcy to the political and economic 
hegemony of the bourgeois classes through asserting their cultural privilege and 
sanctioning their opinion about the appropriated forms of art175
Yet, the Egyptian film productions after 1970 exposed a deep contradiction in the 
reception process of this hegemonic cultural bourgeoisie in Egypt. Since 1970 Egyptian 
cinema started to portray the lower classes in films whose viewers are mostly from the 
middle and upper classes. The upper and middle classes were represented as less 
powerful and dominant. In contrast, the vulgar mannerisms and expressions of the lower 
classes were represented as prevalent and more appealing. The cinematic characters of 
the lower classes embodied by the comedian Adel Emam
.  
176
                                                     
173 . Bourdieu, Pierre. 1984. Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press. P. 466. 
174 . Habitus in Bourdieu’s framework generates a system of meanings that spread consciously and 
unconsciously to set general dispositions of body and mind prepared to accept the dominant structures and 
function according to their limitations. Bourdieu claims that the social actions and practices are 
predetermined by their economic and social conditions of existence. These conditions structure their 
correspondent ‘habitus’ within which the social agents’ practices are codified and classified.  
(1940- present) in the 1970s 
175 . Bourdieu, Pierre. 1991. Language and Symbolic Power, Harvard University Press  P. 110. 
176 . Adel Emam is one of the most famous and glamorous Egyptian comedians (1940- present). He led a 
long and successful career acting light comedy films that topped the Egyptian movie charts and were 
biggest box-office movies for nearly four successive decades. In the seventies and eighties, he portrayed the 
middle class personages struggling with their deteriorating economic situation and the moral and social 
implications of their predicament. He depicted the superior position acquired by lower classes after the 
open door policies (See Armbrust, Walter. 1995. “New Cinema, Commercial Cinema, and the Modernist 
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and 1980s achieved a great success among the middle and upper class audience. Many 
comic quotes from Emam’s movies are still remembered and deployed in everyday life 
situations by many Egyptians regardless of their class position177. These media 
productions were still aggressively criticized in the official media as a kind of ‘bad art’, at 
the same time they were collecting high revenues in the box- office placing Emam on the 
top of the Egyptian cinema charts as the most popular star in the entire modern history of 
Egypt178
In 2002 the representation of the lower classes began to take a different pathway 
where vulgar mannerisms, language and pronunciation disorders, and a focus on 
formalities were stressed as the main features of the lower class image in cinema. This 
.  
I argue in this chapter that this contradiction (featuring lower classes and being 
successfully received by upper classes) is governing the reception of Heen Maysara and 
El Lemby as well, but in a more aggressive way. The rituals of viewership of the two 
films combines violence and laughter and makes of sympathy with the poor a formal 
façade behind which the upper classes establish more distance from the poor. Moreover, I 
assume that this contradictory relation to the films reflects dynamic of state/subjects 
relations in many dimensions. Class racism and violence disclosed in the films and partly 
in their reception reproduce in many respects the relation between the ruling power and 
the subordinate subjects. The middle class viewers judge Heen Maysara and El Lemby 
from a higher position that enable them to distance their practices from these 
representations. Their depiction of the vulgarity of the characters in both films implies a 
defensive strategy against the possible merger of their world with that of ashwaiyyat.  
 
5.2. Acquiring Simultaneous Disgust and Appeal  
 
                                                                                                                                                              
Tradition in Egypt”, in Alif: Journal of Comparative Poetics, No. 15, Arab Cinematics: Toward the New 
and the Alternative, pp. 81- 129). 
177 . Many works of Emam portrayed low class paupers where their way of speaking and the prominent 
idiotic manners ignited laughter and brought him fame. These included for example, Ragab Fuk Safih 
Sakhen (Ragab on top of a hot tank 1979), Shaaban Taht Al Sifr (Shaaban subzero 1980), El Halfoot (The 
pauper 1985). These films focused on the rapid ascension of nouveaux riches after the implementation of 
the open door policies and the exploitation of the poor characters embodied by Emam. 
178 . See Tarek El Shenawi’s article in Al Dustur newspaper in February 2008 criticizing Emam for 
presenting artificial kind of art that supports the dominant discourses of the state and capitalize on  a 
shallow concept of laughter and comedy. 
85 
 
kind of representation is an inversion of a tradition that was established in the 1980s and 
1990s thanks to the young generation of film makers that appeared in Egypt at the 
time179
“In this period, we saw ourselves as the avant-garde that appreciates ‘culture’. We 
were making movies of the cultural elite speaking about the poor classes. 
Nowadays, the film makers are closer to the everyday life of their audience, 
consumers like them and struggling with the same problems, so if they were 
making my film ‘Kaboria’ (Crab)
. The films of this group of film makers presented the poor classes’ life from a 
humanistic and more realistic point of view. Khairy Bishara claims: 
 “We had a different concern, I wanted to say that all this ascension is fake, and 
these acquisitions that the poor get are not for real and will be robbed from them, 
and this is an infinite cycle and a game that is bigger than what you think, you 
will not be one of them so be yourself, this was my understanding of a progressive 
thought… “ 
 
I presume that the repetitive representation of the lower classes in the Egyptian 
cinema after 2002, symbolizes a disjuncture of the classical class hierarchy and taste that 
used to influence film production in Egypt. The environment that gave rise to Bishara and 
his generation’s films in the 1980s and 1990s was quiet different. Bishara explains:  
180
  Bishara’s comment affirms the difference in how media representations of the 
poor after 2002 established a shallow relation with the social reality. Representation is 
much closer to reality and adopting its rough facets, yet it does not address the underlying 
complexities of poverty and marginality. Heroism of the marginalized in films after 2002 
became a necessity even if it lacks substance. The audience is less tolerant of a human 
character that lives a multi-layered reality imbued with frustration and disintegration. The 
absurdity that El Lemby, Hashisha and Fathi survive is harsh yet it still fills the dramatic 
text with laughter and jokes. The heroes, always victorious at the end, tell infinite jokes 
and a lot of wisdom with the same impaired pronunciation and incoherence. Their jokes 
 today they would make my hero succeed to 
marry the wealthy lady and become rich.” 
 
                                                     
179 . The generation of the directors Daod Abd El Sayed, Khairy Bishara, Mohamed Khan, Radwan El 
Kashef, Magdi Ahmed Ali and Atef El Tayeb were concerned with presenting films about the marginalized 
strata and the poor classes through the eighties and nineties. Among these films were: “Al Kit Kat- 1991”, 
“The thief of happiness- 1994” (Daod Abd El Sayed), “The dates riquor- 1999” and “The magician- 2002” 
(Radwan El Kashef), “Life, my passion- 1996” (Magdi Ahmed Ali) and “The skillful- 1983” (Mohamed 
Khan).   
180 . “Kaboria” (Crab) 1990, a film directed by Khairy Bishara portraying an encounter between a poor 
popular boxer and an extremely rich bourgeois married couple.  
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ignite laughter of their audience and their wisdom and victory asserts their heroism and 
declares their success to substitute the old ‘middle class’ superman. Wael Abd El Fattah 
sums up the difference between the ‘marginalized’ in the 1980s and 2002: 
 “Even the idea of the ‘marginalized’ that the critics announced as the heroes of 
the 1980s cinema (Mohamed Khan, Khairy Bishara, Daod Abd El Sayed and 
Radwan El Kashif…), did not present the wretched in its harsh form. It was the 
director’s vision for a world that is close to the real world and it cherishes heroes 
that are not heroes in the traditional perspective. But El Lemby and his fellows are 
the creation of one man: Mohamed Saad. The character eats the film. And its 
image is presented exactly as it is, without any external vision”181
Despite the increasingly unequal realities that the poor classes in Egypt struggle 
with, the systemic deterioration of the political and socioeconomic conditions in Egypt 
created a common language that a broader range of social classes share. Without 
substantial changes in the economic situation of the poor in Egypt, that may be even 
worsening
  
 
182
 “It is not only about art, there is a mere commercial dimension in making such 
films, the middle class created characters from ashwaiyyat instead of making 
middle class characters to say ‘we have those weird creatures’, the audience wants 
to see them transformed into ‘creatures’ and you (as producer) want to please 
them more than speak about real problems” 
, their participation in the political sphere relatively increased after several 
sit-ins were carried out and were covered by the Egyptian media. From another angle, the 
constantly nurtured sense of threat by the ashwaiyyat, drowning in poverty and chaos, 
propelled a collective keenness among the upper classes to call for a fair resolution of 
their inhumane life conditions. Media professionals had to find a more appealing formula 
to profit from this invasion of the media by ashwaiyyat residents. The noble cause of 
delivering the suffering of those people to the circles of decision-makers was not the only 
reason behind the increased representation. Tarek Al Shinawi elaborates: 
183
   My interest in the following paragraphs is to analyze how Heen Maysara and El 
Lemby achieved such a big success and appealed to the middle and upper classes in 
Egypt. In addition to the analysis I presented in chapter four for the commonalities shared 
by the middle class and ashwaiyyat residents, this chapter focuses on the simultaneous 
 
 
                                                     
181 . Wael Abd Al Fattah. 2002. “The making of stars in Egypt”. Soot Al Ummah newspaper. August 5th, 
2002. P12. 
182. Refer to 3.2. 3. Mubarak: The rule of impunity and the perception of the poor. 
183 . Interview with Al Shinawi in October 2008. 
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disgust and appeal that surrounded the two films. The reasons for such contradictory 
stances are explicable through highlighting how the film makers in both movies created a 
stage against which the seemingly shocking scenes were presented, what I refere to below 
as the “necessary balances.” I then offer an interpretation of the reactions (through my 
ethnographic sample) of the audience to provide the reader with more insights about the 
socio-cultural roots of the films’ success. 
 
5.3. Necessary Balances 
 
In 2004, Kanaan Makiya wrote his account on artistic representation in Saddam 
Hussein’s Iraq. There he analyzes the difficult situation that governs artistic production 
under despotic rule: 
“Quentin Bell184 says that ‘bad’ art is a form of insincerity, which results from 
‘social pressure in favor of that which society at large calls beauty’. In the last one 
hundred years, he claims, the good artist has always fought against the popular 
conception of beauty while the bad artist has worked within its constraints. 
Naturally, the president thinks of himself as the creator of a great work of art, not 
a bad one, to this Bell retorts: ‘The damnable thing about bad art is that the 
insincerity which lies at its roots is not perceived by the artist himself’185
“Definitely the regime is to behold responsible for the status of chaos we live in 
Egypt and the present rule is illegitimate and is not product of real democratic 
elections. And whether this is apparent in my film or not I do imagine it that way, 
and even away from the film, my opinion is that the government of NDP 
(National Democratic Party) is the reason behind all the disasters of the country. It 
is an authority that gives nothing and speaks since the eighties on the employment 
of 5 million citizens and this did not happen. And also speaks about providing 
housing and small projects and achieves nothing of this. In contrast, people are 
. 
 
Makiya maps out in his work the pressures and determinants under a despotic repressive 
regime that influence artistic production and transform its nature even subconsciously 
without the artist’s awareness of them. In Heen Maysara, the director Khaled Youssef 
claims a total responsibility and moreover finds necessary to present his film, which 
embodies a harsh criticism of the ruling regime: 
                                                     
184 . Bell, Quentin. 1989. Bad Art. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. P. 13. 
185. Makiya, Kanaan. 2004. The Monument: Art and Vulgarity in Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. Berkeley: 
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turning poorer and unemployed and we live in a society that made bribery a 
legacy for living, bribes run the country”186
Bearing in mind the receptive audience’ sensitivities, Youssef and Abd Al 
Rahman presented a sharply polarized image of the upper class characters. The latter 
were slotted either in extremely idealistic or evil models of representation. Although 
Youssef emphasizes the despising public gaze towards homeless street adults, for 
instance in the scene where Ayman and his wife are trying to sell flowers to two upper 
class lovers, he did stress the tears of the woman who brought Ayman up when her 
husband forced her to get rid of him after she got pregnant. Similarly, Youssef presented 
the example of the old lady helping Nahed and embracing her warmly inside her house as 
if it was a natural and expected behavior. Leila Abo Zeid
.   
 
However, Youssef and Nasser Abd Alrahman were cautious while hitting at the 
sensitive issues that would not appeal to their targeted audience (middle class and 
government!!) or would cross the political red lines defined by the political regime. This 
cautiou pushed them to compromises that pervaded their text with contradictory signs. 
These contradictions rendered the singling out of ashwaiyyat residents’ as the only 
marginal and excluded lot in society doubtful. In two principal axes of the film, this 
caution is most clear. The first concerns situations of direct encounter with the Egyptian 
security apparatus which will be discussed in details in the coming chapter. The second is 
the representation of the upper and middle class characters in the film in their encounters 
with the residents of ashwaiyyat.   
187
                                                     
186 . Youssef’s interview in Al Wafd newspaper, December 2007. 
187. Personal interview with Leila Abo Zeid who is an Egyptian female teacher working at the Ministry of 
Education, January 2008.  
 (53 years old) commented on 
this scene: “I wouldn’t ever do it, and I don’t think anyone would, I can’t deal with them 
to that extent; adopt a homeless child or take a homeless lady into my house, this is very 
unrealistic. I was touched by the film but it is the role of the government to handle their 
problems, what can I do?” May El Sayed in another interview agrees: “I think neither El 
Lemby or Heen Maysara gave a realistic account of the middle class, or ‘us’ (with slight 
mockery), it’s either very angelic view or very monstrous. The reaction of the sons after 
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the old lady dies is more expectable, they will suspect the girl immediately and kick her 
out.”  
El Lemby producers, who had a better chance to hide behind the comic 
performance of Saad and the light comedy plots, ended their film nevertheless with a 
scene that appeared out of context. El Lemby appeared wearing his robe du chambre and 
teaching his son the English alphabet on a blackboard. Borrowing only his body moves 
and way of pronunciation from the original character, the scene (12 seconds) delivered a 
sense of security to its audience: “Can we argue that this scene is also rebellious?!” 
argued Myvel Seddik when I asked her whether she thinks that the film criticizes the 
middle class traditions. The scene cannot be accepted as part and parcel of the film. It is 
rather part, may be, of the wishful thinking of the film-makers who aspire that El 
Lemby’s vulgarity is to be disciplined and refined. Belal Fadl188
“We all see variations of El Lemby in the Egyptian street, in schools and 
universities and in the state employees, may be not that exaggerated but all of 
them have inside something from El Lemby, there is a dangerous social impact 
that we should be alert to; success this time was not a momentary identification 
with a ‘character’ that has an expiry date, what Saad presented is not within a 
frame of absurdity, El Lemby reached out to the most important sectors of the 
 the famous scriptwriter 
asserts: 
“Wael Ehsan, the director, was a poor guy from Ismailia, and he has this 
simplistic conviction that things would go very well when one makes some effort, 
poverty can be easily overcome. Saad also comes from ‘Aleet El Kabsh’, also 
ashwaiyyat, and he says that he lived with people exactly like El Lemby and 
wanted to express how they long for a descent ‘normal’ life.” 
 
 In my judgment, the audience was not in need for such “balances” to confer 
desirability on both films. In fact, the main point about both movies was the powerfulness 
of their representation of the vulgarity that characterizes the behavior of all figures 
including middle class characters. It is this storm of violence, offensiveness and 
aggression seen in every detail of both movies – whether in the comic use of El Lemby of 
his knife to threaten people who are certain he will never dare to hurt them, or how 
simply a big fight is ignited from nothing in Heen Maysara –  that was both shocking and 
appealing. Tarek El Shenawi confirms this assumption:  
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society because they wanted him, and if this is not true for those who pay the 
tickets, it would have only been a moderate hit.”189
                                                     
189 . Tarek Al Shinawi, Al Dustour daily newspaper, April 2008. 
 
 
5.4. Watching the decay of the ‘Modern’ 
 
The similarity or the common language that Al Shinawi assumes between El 
Lemby and the audience can be interpreted as signs and signifieds that indicate a subtle 
mockery of the failed or distorted modernity project of the Egyptian nation-state. The 
audience presumably identified with a narrative that makes ‘truer’ the decay and 
precariousness of the modern institutions that once were the most desired of ambitions of 
the middle class. For example, the films announce news that Egyptians confront everyday 
in their encounter with the institutions of law and education.  El Lemby’s mother warns 
him before getting to the exam of ‘erasing illiteracy’: “Your studying in your head, your 
sandwiches in your bag and your knife in your pocket, if somebody asked to cheat cut 
him into pieces”. The combination she made between acquiring a superficial education 
(later we see her dictating the answers to her son in the microphone), guaranteeing food 
and means of protection structures the everyday priorities in the Egyptian society 
nowadays. Mohamed Samir (university student, 22 years old) states: “I am not sure if I 
had a quarrel with a police officer who wants to detain me for no reason, arguing that 
these are my constitutional rights as a citizen it will work, you can never be sure”. 
Mohamed resumes: “A large number of my friends hold knives, they are wealthy and 
potent, they have connections, but they want to guarantee maximum safety and they 
know nobody can arrest them for this, in Heen Maysara they could arrest and torture 
people because they are poor.”  
El Lemby and Heen Maysara delineated this insecurity and absence of the modern 
institutions that regulate this violence or that guarantee a minimum of respect and 
humanity for the common person no matter what his/her class is. Making fun of the 
notion of education, the brutalization by the police in El Lemby and demonstrating the 
atrocities and torture in the police stations in Heen Maysara attracted the subordinated 
audience. As Mbembe explains: 
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“Enjoyment and need for assuagement are thus complementary and take various 
forms: excess and intemperance, extravagance and dereliction, the capacity to set 
limits (arbitrariness) and to breach them (transgression) - in short, apparent 
facility with which, with a simple fiat, one can decide to set up anything or 
abolish anything. So impunity reins. One lets it all hang out. One eats what there 
is, with no care for the morrow”190
In other scenes and plots in El Lemby an alternative discourse started to substitute 
the dominant discourse of modernization that has been adopted by the state throughout 
contemporary Egyptian history. Modernization that bears usually connotations of 
progress, refinement, and the superiority of the educated or the cultural elite of the 
society was the subject of many sarcastic scenes in El Lemby. The film portrayed El 
Lemby in two different situations showing his despise for classical music (Western or 
. 
 
The “reign of impunity” is articulated in many areas of both films. Not only in the 
series of events in Heen Maysara, starting from selling the child of Nahed and Hashisha 
to a wealthy infertile family by a bus driver until the internal governance of the locality 
by Hashisha (the notable thug that collects money to instate order and protection), but 
also the easiness (or facility) and the settled tolerance for their occurrence. For example, 
the number of times when Hashisha gets in and out of prison after the fabrication of false 
or true minor crimes (by the police officer), were easily accepted by the rest of 
inhabitants as part of the price of this relationship and becoming one of the notable 
persons dealing with the security apparatus. On the other hand, giving birth to the love 
child in the streets, homeless children excavating parking cars and stealing the laundry 
from houses, Fathi who threatens to kill another resident if he does not agree to let him 
marry his sister, the step-father who keeps harassing Nahed in front of her mother and the 
frank and masked rape, all happened in Heen Maysara without any sort of interference 
from the law institution with its visible executive branch (security apparatus) or its 
abstract moral presence. Similarly in El Lemby, we could notice that drug trade and usage 
of knives were presented as regular practices that hurt nobody. On the other hand, the 
police officers (representatives of the state authority’s regulations) were constantly 
provoked to prove all the attempts by El Lemby to earn a living as illegal requiring 
detention.  
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Egyptian) and ‘modern’ dance as forms of ‘refined art’. Uncle Bach, a violin player in El 
Lemby’s district, appears in one of the scenes trying persistently to force El Lemby to 
listen to him playing a part of a violin concerto telling him: “I am cleaning your ears”. El 
Lemby with utter confidence starts to listen and commented (always in his stoned tone): 
“It is disgusting, I can’t stand.” El Lemby decides to leave the house and Bach keeps 
tracking him with his violin to bring the scene to a point where El Lemby reverses the 
common rhetoric from respect to Uncle Bach’s music as a form of refinement while he is 
escaping the nauseating repellent music. El Lemby was declaring that such a respect is 
also decaying.  
In contrast, the film depicted El Lemby at his wedding (with all his quarter 
neighbors invited, with everybody drinking beer and smoking hash) singing: “Go away 
cock, this chick is not yours” (teasing the ex-fiancée of his wife) and dancing hilariously 
with his typical belly and butt moves. The song used the melody of a famous song of Um 
Kulthum “Hob Eih?” (What love?), but changed the lyrics to invoke cynical and 
sensational meanings. It announces another form of music that the hero likes and sings 
with ecstasy and enchantment. El Lemby used these lyrics instead of Um Kulthum’s and 
danced at his wedding, instead of a ‘modern’ dance professional that is supposed to dance 
for his invitees.  
The character of the modern dancer hired to dance at weddings taking place in a 
popular quarter is another representation, in my view, of the decline of the modernization 
discourse. El Lemby had this chat with the dancer where they were shown clearly 
speaking two different languages as if coming from totally different worlds. El Lemby 
asks her about the belly dancing suit that she is supposed to wear and ‘seduce’ all the 
invitees (as he said). The dancer, wearing glasses, black blouse and trousers, tells El 
Lemby that she feels she cannot make a modern dance performance for those ‘weird’ 
people as ‘she doubts that any of them has an email address or an ICQ account!!’. Two 
people were represented as not belonging to the same rhetoric, as possessing opposing 
histories and referential points. El Lemby and Uncle Bach or El Lemby and the dancer 
were coupled in those scenes as two opposite discourses or two contradictory currents of 
thought; yet in both scenes only the hero has an upper hand. For the audience who 
praised El Lemby’s cynicism, the refinement claimed by the modern social institutions is 
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more of a formality that did not inscribe itself in their practices. Their disgust of the belly 
and butt moves of El Lemby hides a deeper level of desire to transgress this discourse and 
admit its limited influence on their lives.  
5.5. Vulgarity, Violence and Laughter 
While the mockery of the failed modernity project that once stood on the 
shoulders of a burgeoning middle class is one pillar of the big success of Heen Maysara 
and El Lemby, the transgression of this middle class’ appropriated behavior and moral 
discourse would be the second pillar. The physical performance of Saad in El Lemby and 
the sex scenes in Heen Maysara would be a good example of how the audience met such 
a violation of its moral code with a mixture of desire and disgust. 
   Saad’s performance presents an image of an exorbitantly transgressive material 
(given his movements of belly and the excessive use of his butt). This trend of ‘male’ 
movements (which makes it even more intolerable in common Egyptian culture) spread 
lately among some shaabi singers like Saad Al Saghir and Emad Baarour191 and 
positioned the body as “the principal locale of the idioms and fantasies used in depicting 
power” as Mbembe claims192
 “If the magnetism of the grotesque indeed generates conflict between attraction 
and disgust it is exactly because attraction and disgust are driven here by the same 
force: ego’s recognition that a scene otherwise familiar has been pushed to the 
extremes of abnormality.”
. Such transgression is necessarily attractive to the subject 
(in this case cinema audience) that realizes through Saad’s bodily movements the 
possibility of exceeding the norm. Trouillot argues: 
193
Saad’s vulgar body movements speak to the implicit desires of exceeding 
appropriate behavior and challenging the essential assumptions that institutionalize its 
 
 
                                                     
191. Saad Al Saghir and Emad Baarour are the shaabi singers famous for their obscene video clips in the last 
six years. Saad’s performance and dancing style that borrows techniques of belly dancing stood out as a 
striking phenomena when his video clip El Enab (the grapes) was screened on Melody satellite music 
channel 2005. Saad faced a storm of criticism accusing him of offending the public sentiments and 
presenting obscene dance and singing, incompatible with the social moralities and the religious legacies. 
Calls for banning Saad from TV became part of the public discourse in newspapers, parliament and the 
media. 
192 . Mbembe, A. (2002). "On the Power of the False." Public Culture 14 (3): 629. 
193 . Trouillot, Michel- Rolph. 1992. “The vulgarity of power” Public Culture 5(1): P. 77.    
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domination. Nurturing the rival fantasies of vulgarity inside the souls of the Egyptian 
audience watching El Lemby can be regarded as the other side of the coin of the assumed 
power of the modernization discourse which is, allegorically, the power of the state. The 
character in El Lemby embodies other features of the ruling power aside from its adoption 
of the modernity slogans, namely its obscenity and vulgarity. The ability of such power to 
exceed and transcend the limits of the social restrictions is the clearest evidence of its 
omnipotence and sovereignty. As Trouillot argues, “The imagery of power is excess. 
Excess, in turn, breeds vulgarity”194
 Mbembe traces the correlation between the banality of power and the aesthetics 
of vulgarity in the postcolonial state of Cameroon. He presumes that there is no clear 
distinction between the producers and the receivers of the dominant public discourse. He 
further argues that the dominant forces together with the dominated ones “reproduce the 
de facto power relations through the continuous processes of simulation”.  Mbembe 
considers not only the way in which power lays claim to its subjects through coercion and 
violence, but also how that “coercive power compels its subjects to rearticulate that 
power, to confer grandeur on that power, and to do this through a convivial participation 
in simulation of that power."
. Saad, who extravagantly simulated the Egyptian 
social reality where power abuse and violence are essential features, unconsciously 
reinstates this discourse of vulgar deployment of power through his transgressive body 
movements. The middle class viewers who created the icon of El Lemby participate, in 
one way or another, in reproducing a simulation of the power relations between different 
classes in Egypt.  
195Mbembe identifies this ‘conviviality’ as the guarantee to 
preserve the subjection and submission of the postcolonial state subjects. This 
conviviality unifies the rulers and the ruled under a practical system of signs and 
metaphors of mutual appreciation and apprehension (simulacrum) that end up by robbing 
both parties of their vitality. These vulgar practices of the subordinated subjects become a 
node in the chain of the official world’s obscenity where the dominant and the dominated 
are inscribed within the same episteme196
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It is within the space of representation that the traditional subjects of the state 
were allowed a chance to simulate the power agents and reproduce their discourse and 
their violent practices and even to make fun of all that. Mbembe viewed the post-colony 
as the ‘chaotically pluralistic’ space where the dominated inscribe and reproduce the 
patterns of violence and coercion by the state power.  
This would be the case with the claimed powerfulness of Hashisha in Heen 
Maysara and of El Lemby in El Lemby. Despite all his sufferings and repeated failures, 
El Lemby preserves a sense of dignity and an unexplained self confidence. After coming 
back from Sharm El Sheikh and the failure of his project to rent bicycles for tourists 
(illegal as usual), El Lemby says to his mother: “I am still El Lemby, the man which an 
earthquake that shakes entire Egypt do not dare shake him”. However, El Lemby 
combined this sense of powerfulness (always artificial and exaggerated) with a 
corresponding modesty and low self-esteem that surge up in all the situations of his 
frustration: “In the bottom of his heart he feels he is great, for no reason, he is illiterate, 
ignorant and a complete looser, yet he thinks he can handle everything with the knife”, 
comments Mohamed Samir, 21 years old, faculty of commerce student.  
This defensive attitude of El Lemby speaks on behalf of his audience and 
represents its “neurotic ego” that Anna Freud describes in her account of the mechanisms 
of defense: 
“When the ego is young and plastic, its withdrawal from one field of activity is 
sometimes compensated for by excellence in another, upon which it concentrates. 
But, when it has become rigid or has already acquired an intolerance of ‘pain’ and 
so is obsessionally fixated to a method of flight, such withdrawal is punished by 
impaired development. By abandoning one position after another, it becomes one 
sided, looses too many interests and can show but a meager achievement.”197
The defensive accent of El Lemby assuming unlimited power and capacity (‘I 
would destroy the world and burn the whole district’) is probably his own way to 
negotiate his submissiveness to incredible levels of exclusion and violence. The grandeur 
that he preserves in all the humiliating situations he encounters (‘you want El Lemby 
work as a peddler and sell sandwiches?’) is part of the image of heroism that he survives 
in an imaginary trajectory against the classicist arrogant discourse of upper classes and 
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the brutality of the state. The fantasy of heroism is the compensatory mechanism that El 
Lemby presented to the whole society facing the same brutality. The psychoanalyst Khalil 
Fadil argues: 
“Mohamed Saad or El Lemby is not a real psychopath, he is a hazy image of him, 
the criminal psychopath is those who fled with the billions of the country, the 
authority abusers and the cruel corrupt whales who eat everything, those who 
sexually harass all bodies and souls while struggling for earning their living. El 
Lemby is a social ‘homosapien’ present among us, inside and around us. He has a 
network of relations with people in ashwaiyyat, in the country and in the city. 
From his figure, voice and way of pronunciation, he constitutes an 
independent structure that can be called ‘the Lemby structure’. It is present all 
over Egypt and has its tools and environment and its way in sneaking into the 
social life of all classes, starting from the poor that Saad represents not ending by 
those who see him disgusting but love his harshness and irony full heartedly. 
 El Lemby grasps in his dirty hands the smell of our violent animalistic 
social behavior that we practice against each other. The behavior that extends 
from body movements to sexual harassment in the streets which makes us like 
animals that appreciate vulgar behaviors… While all of us suffering from 
emotional austerity and the unjustifiably swollen ego, Saad and Wael Ehsan 
succeed to synthesize that disenfranchised sad psychopath and fail to actualize a 
real human being with assimilated emotions and moralities”198
 Fadel points out how El Lemby presented a weak character that borrows only the 
superficial features of grotesque power. His weakness is probably behind the empathy 
and identification of his audience with his case that may simulate theirs too. However, El 
Lemby represents an easy remedy for the inability to express or resist the violence they 
confront. While the upper classes are stuck with their predicament between decline and 
ascension, crackling with laughter on the ‘social homosapien’ seems a way to displace 
the fears from the dissemination of ‘El Lemby structure’ in all the institutions that used to 
guarantee their privileged position. This extreme polarization, obvious in Fadel’s 
analysis, of the society between those who acquire animalistic behavior and those who 
acquire a human one conveys the worries that infuse the social imaginary with loathe to 
El Lemby.  Such a violent radical metaphor (animalistic) is meant to protect the middle 
class hegemony on the vocabulary of the cultural discourse and ensure a safe position 
under the umbrella of grotesque power. The producers of El Lemby helped the audience 
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to laugh at one’s demoralized ego and forget about their subordination to the state, while 
excited with a temporary victory in the contest between classes. 
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Chapter Six 
The Security Apparatus: Only in Ashwaiyyat? 
6.1. Introduction 
One of the remarkable elements in the representation of social reality in Heen 
Maysara and El Lemby was essentializing the role of the police institution in structuring 
both the public and private lives of the characters. In both films police officers and 
stations materialize as the primary site where state presence and control are articulated 
and manifested. It is also the police institution that interferes in all matters of daily life in 
ashwaiyyat to ensure a minimum of security and order, thus guarding the status quo. The 
assertion of such a presence can be better viewed within the framework of the maximized 
power and authoritarianism of the official security apparatus in Egypt over the last 
decades. Saif Nasrawi199
“These apparatuses control and manipulate the bureaucracy, the judiciary, and the 
parliament, the economy, universities, political parties, professional syndicates, 
trade unions, NGOs, the press, churches, mosques, the Internet and public 
morality.  Their influence also extends to foreign policy, diplomacy and 
international trade. Occupying such a pivotal role within the regime, the security 
apparatus is the largest entity in terms of membership in the state’s bureaucracy.  
Their membership has been estimated between 950,000 and 1,100,000 persons.  
And their share in the annual budget comes only second to that of the army and by 
far larger than the government’s expenditure on health and education”
 points out that the security apparatus, especially those 
establishments which are politically-oriented such as Mabahith Aman al-Dawla (State 
Security Investigation Apparatus, SSIA), al-Aman al-Markazi (the Central Security 
Forces), al-Mukhabarat al-‘Aama (the Intelligence), and Maglis al-Amn al-Qawmi (the 
National Security Council) have assumed an increasing role during Mubarak’s reign.  
The Egyptian security apparatuses, according to Nasrawi, exercise their hegemony, 
control and discipline on almost all domains of public sphere: institutional and un-
institutional, formal and informal, and governmental and societal: 
200
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Nasrawi describes how the politics of fear became more essential to establish an absolute 
domination of the security apparatus over public life under Mubarak’s rule: 
“Capitalizing on a radical notion of nationalism, the security apparatus projects 
itself beyond the scope of class politics; thus, it positions itself as keeping a 
distance from any social group by representing a neutral and rational façade.  This 
role is further enhanced by continuous dissemination of conspiracy theories about 
imaginary enemies, domestic and foreign who are trying to “tarnish the image of 
Egypt”, “revoke external intervention” and so on.  Consequently, a state of fear 
must be always fed continuously to strengthen the grip of the security apparatuses 
over the Egyptians’ bodies and souls.  The politics of fear can be felt directly 
through police’s abuse, harassment and torture in streets, demonstrations, 
detention centers and prisoners and indirectly by nurturing a state of uncertainty 
and unpredictability about so many affairs in life such as appointments in the 
bureaucracy, the judiciary and the army, getting different licenses to start a 
business, to establish a voluntary association, to found a newspaper and even to 
install an electricity meter in your house”201
 However, this presence of the state remains incomplete if it was not for a network 
of relations with notables from the ashwaiyy district, whose task is to monitor and 
facilitate the everyday activities inside the district without direct interference of the 
. 
 
Lately, the Egyptian media disclosed the processes of regular torture of lay 
persons, including females, in the police stations. The most widely covered torture 
incident in Egypt recently was the case of Eimad El-Kabir, a mini-bus driver who was 
brutally and sexually assaulted in a police station after quarrelling with a police officer. 
Such a blunt declaration of torture heightened national and international awareness of the 
immensity and brutality of the Egyptian security apparatus. Yet, we have no data to 
confirm whether this disclosure assisted in the propagation or the resistance to the politics 
of fear deployed by the political regime. Disseminating such information is one of the 
most prominent indicators of the state violating the social codes of legitimate violence 
and exceeding the previous limits to its authoritarianism. This pattern of authoritarianism 
was stressed many times in El Lemby and Heen Maysara which presented the scene of 
torture of Hashisha’s family in the police station including sexually harassing his mother 
and Fathi’s wife to oblige him to admit a connection to the Islamist militant groups in his 
district and to Al Qaeda as well!!  
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police. Salwa Ismail identifies the emerging alternative of local governance created by 
the inclusion of the notables (like Hashisha in his district) and promoting them as figures 
of authority: 
“Through state authorities’ incorporation of the lesser notables and through the 
farming out of positions of authority, an urban regime of government is 
actualized. Politics in the sense of action is taken to affect the conduct of 
government as a form of mediation rather than representation. This image of the 
state and such incorporation into the system of government underscores a mode of 
operation characterized by improvisation. It would be difficult to prescribe a 
unitary logic to how local government is managed on daily basis”202
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Such an improvised model of governance was presented in Heen Maysara as the 
form that suits the half hazard space with all the disorganization that characterizes its 
system. Similarly, the violent practices and the prejudiced judgments of police officers 
were justified as mechanisms to reduce the potential hazards and crimes of the residents 
and prevent their expansion outside the boundaries of that locality. Again, the 
representation of the behavior of the police in the films (especially Heen Maysara) 
affirms the common assumptions about the ashwaiyyat as spaces that incubate criminals, 
thugs and Islamist fanatics, threatening to disturb the peace of the middle class 
neighborhoods.  
The films induce another sort of submissiveness to the prevalent discourses about 
ashwaiyyat when it restricts such a brutal behavior of the police to the ashwaiyyat and 
their residents. In Heen Maysara, the police actions are all represented as reactionary to 
the massive violence and thuggery that prevail in the district. Detention and the 
deployment of exceptional laws (in torture for example) are justified as prophylactic 
measures that guard the safety of the whole society from Baltaggiya (thugs) and fanatics 
dwelling in ashwaiyyat. The police officers were always looking at Hashisha as the 
despised agent that they use only to reach for the fanatics hiding in “ashwaiyy mazes” 
they cannot invade.  
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 The discourse articulated by the head officers to express why they rely on 
Hashisha as a murshid (guide) for the police reproduces the spatial frameworks of 
classification that do not perceive ashwaiyyat as recognizable urban spaces. In a scene 
where the senior officer yells at the junior officer after his arrest of Hashisha, he ties the 
presence of the state inside the district to the role of Hashisha because without ‘one like 
him’ (in his words), the officer would lose his track and be unable to reach the terrorists 
hiding inside ashwaiyyat’. Assef Bayat explores how such a spatial perception of 
ashwaiyyat contributes to the political discourse around them as non-modern ‘abnormal 
sites which provide housing for ‘abnormal’ people: 
 
“Indeed, the strict official definition of what consists an urban unit and the 
invention of the concept of ahswaiyyat as a political category tend to produce new 
spatial divisions which excludes many citizens from urban participation. The 
ashwaiyyat are perceived as ‘abnormal’ places where, in modern conventional 
wisdom, the ‘non- modern’ and thus ‘non- urban’ people, that is, the villagers, the 
traditionalists, the non- conformists and the unintegrated live. It is indeed 
puzzling that over 20 percent of all Egypt’s and half of greater Cairo’s 
populations, who reside in ashwaiyyat, are considered outsiders, living in 
‘abnormal’ conditions”203
The sequence of events in Hashisha’s life put him in direct interface with security 
forces. The situations differed as did his position: from drug dealer to police guide and 
notable of the district ending eventually to work against the police after the atrocious 
torture of his family at the police station. These encounters reflect in different situations 
the structures of thought behind the behavior of the security forces when dealing with 
ashwaiyyat. Hashisha’s life is long journey trying to acquire money and notability. He 
started by joining a big drug dealer’s network but failed to keep the amount of drugs he 
had to distribute (after smoking some of it with his friend Fathi). The head of the drug 
group ordered his followers to beat Hashisha and report him to the security forces. The 
police officer made a deal with Hashisha to provide him protection in return for 
  
 
6.2. Eliminating Danger or Institutionalizing Baltaga? 
                                                     
203 . Bayat, Asef and Eric Denis. 2000. “Who is Afraid of Ashwaiyyat? Urban Change and Politics in 
Egypt” in Environment and Urbanization 12; No 2. Pp. 185- 199. P.197    
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monitoring and reporting all the activities of the drug dealers and Islamist fanatics in the 
area. Based on that agreement, Hashisha was released from the prison to engage in a 
bloody battle with swords and knives against the followers of the big drug dealer. The 
battle ended with Hashisha being declared as the local governor of his district that 
practices a mixed role between Futtuwah and Baltagi204
Before he started his fifth term in office in 2005 Mubarak promised more 
democracy. But despite some changes, for instance allowing a more critical, privately 
 (thug). This role implies, as 
Salwa Ismail explains, agency for the state, interference in fights and monitoring the 
moral conduct of the residents.  
Such an incorporation of the thugs in the security apparatus became part of 
institutionalizing the customary rule of force instead of the rule of law. This substitution 
is based on a set of emergency laws that guarantee an absolute power for the security 
apparatus to instate the rule of exception. Acquiring such an absolute power went through 
phases in the last decades of Mubarak’s rule. In the following section, I will explain these 
phases. 
 It is well known that after the assassination of Anwar Al Sadat in 1981, the ruling 
regime under the leadership of Mubarak declared the implementation of the emergency 
law that still governs the Egyptian public and political life until now. The emergency rule 
provides the regime with the legal right to control every level of political activity. As a 
result, the government is entitled to censor activities including freedom of expression and 
freedom of assembly which include the right to censor, seize, or confiscate letters, 
newspapers, newsletters, publications, and all other means of expression and advertising 
before they are published. President Mubarak argues that the renewal of the emergency 
law is necessary in order to confront terrorism and protect democracy and stability. Yet, 
the law is used to contain and control not just terrorism but also legitimate political 
activities. 
                                                     
204 . Futuwah is an old local term used to be applied on the notables of the popular slum areas who combine 
wisdom and force as tools of sovereignty and instating order and justice.   Dr. Ahmed Al Magdoub, 
professor of criminal law in the national center for sociological and criminological research defines Baltagi 
as ‘a young, unemployed, poor illiterate man who lives in a shanty or slum area, but he usually works in 
middle and upper class districts where people need his services to replace the rule of law’.   
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owned press to flourish, his regime has systematically whittled away civic freedoms205. 
In May 2008, for instance, the government abruptly extended for two years the official 
state of emergency, saying that new antiterrorism laws were not yet ready. The 
emergency laws, which are meant to be applied only against violent threats to the state, 
have in fact been wielded against every manner of dissent. In one form or another they 
have been in force for all but three of the past 50 years. Furthermore, the state has 
surveilled and carried out a series of structural constitutional amendments that enforce the 
government’s control and pave the way for a complete hegemony of the ruling National 
Democratic Party.  The most prominent of these amendments was article 76 concerning 
the regulation of future presidential elections which set harsh terms planned to exclude 
any potential opposition candidate from running to the post206
 “The 1971 constitution, for instance, allows the president to control the 
bureaucracy, the government, the judiciary and the army through both legislation 
and appointment.  In this context, the security officers always recommend specific 
people who are loyal to the regime to fill in the important positions within the 
state.  Simultaneously, the regulations of any state’s institutes were engineered to 
provide its power holders with unlimited authorities.  Thus, the president appoints 
the minister of justice, who in turn, is responsible for appointing and dismissing 
judges, allowing bonuses and promotions and tens of different powers.  The same 
applies for universities, governorates, local governments and almost every 
organization within the state.  Eventually, these power holders, who have been 
largely appointed in their positions according to security recommendation reports, 
have acted as the invisible hand of the regime and its security apparatus.  In this 
sense, certain judges, for example, are positioned in the sensitive electoral centers 
to ensure the chances of government’s candidate to win, or referring sensitive 
lawsuits to specific loyal judges, and so on”
.  
In addition to the constitutional amendments and the oppressive emergency laws, 
the Egyptian juridical system since 1952 was designed to guarantee unlimited authority 
for the executive branch of the state especially the president. Nasrawi claims: 
207
The unlimited authority given to state administrators encouraged them to 
transcend the official regulations and resort to exceptional laws, implementing them in 
 
                                                     
205. “Will the Dam Burst”, The Economist, 11 September.2008. 
206 . International Crisis Group ICG report 2005. 
207 .  Nasrawi, Saif. 2006. “The Egyptian Movement for Change (Kefaya): Apolitical Struggle for 
Democracy”. MA Thesis. The American University in Cairo. P.65. 
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non-exceptional situations. Instating the rule of exception consequently legitimized the 
prevalence of an informal law that perpetuates chaos and impunity. 
6. 3. Becoming Notable… Becoming Hero 
Becoming ‘notables’ of the half-hazard district is part of the heroism that the main 
characters in Heen Maysara and El Lemby claim, thus signaling a new form of self- 
actualization that emerged under violent and bare conditions of life. It is a window of 
opportunity that allowed the paupers relative control on their private lives that are too 
trivial, yet complex, for the state to interfere to manage. Heen Maysara and El Lemby 
represented a society that possesses a mechanism of internal governance unbound by the 
modern institutions. Hence, the films embodied a criticism of the hegemonic discourse 
about the full control of the state over the everyday life of ashwaiyyat residents. The way 
Hashisha continued in his relationship with the police officer is telling about the role of 
minor agents in formulating the state’s moral presence despite of its disengagement from 
running the daily life matters deploying laws and regulations.  
Gradually Hashisha starts to acquire importance for the bosses of the junior police 
officer. They order him to work on monitoring the Islamist groups in the district (‘Drugs 
are not important, those people with beards should be controlled’). This acquired 
importance provoked the young officer who noticed that Hashisha is becoming more 
arrogant and manipulative in their man-to-man encounters. The officer fabricated a drug 
dealing case for Hashisha and arrested him. He was sentenced five years in prison which 
raised the rage of the senior officer who gave a long speech about how the arrogance and 
jealousy of the junior officer made him commit a fatal mistake and lose an important eye 
of the police in the district.  
After the release of Hashisha the police officer goes further in persecuting 
Hashisha and receives information that his brother is a member of Al Qaeda. The officer 
detained Hashisha’s mother and all of his acquaintances like Fathi and his wives and 
tortured them using dogs, electricity and sexual harassment to force them to admit that 
membership. Hashisha, affected by the humiliating scene of torture, swears to take 
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revenge from the officer. He arranges with the leader of the Islamist group in the district 
to make an ambush of the police forces for a big sum of money. The security forces reach 
the district after the militants placed explosives everywhere. Hashisha succeeds to kidnap 
the officer and threaten to kill him. The officer surrenders and begs Hashisha to let him 
live and handled him his gun with his head down. Hashisha says: “Now, I took my 
revenge”. Additional security forces reached the district and ordered the residents to 
evacuate the place because there is a ‘political decision’ to remove it with bulldozers. The 
leader of the Islamist group give orders to explode the district and escapes at the end of 
the film.   
The story of Hashisha demonstrates partly the precariousness of the state’s image 
as it identifies the haphazardness and the utter violence used in managing dangerous 
situations. The film also shows how the unlimited authority given to state officers 
encouraged them to transcend the formal regulations and resort to exceptional laws, 
implementing them in non-exceptional situations. Instating the rule of exception 
consequently legitimized the prevalence of an informal law that perpetuates chaos and 
impunity. Mohamed Said argues: 
“They are not laws in the real meaning of the word; a general statement that 
regulates similar cases or phenomena. They are political orders aiming at 
granting the political system an advantage in every single subject, denying the 
opponents the chance to get any plus even by using force, banning any sort of 
political activity and bridging every gap in the schema of ironic control on the 
public field. That is why all the legislations of the despotic system are extremely 
punishing, very long and badly formulated to ease the criminalization of 
ordinary comportments if needed. This kinky philosophy legitimized chaos and 
made it impossible for state employees to use their minds or depend on a 
juridical reference, because the legislative authority is even more ignorant than 
the executive one, and their cooperation produces a real catastrophe”208
 
  
 
 
                                                     
208 . Said, Mohamed. 2008.  “The state and the chaos” in Al Badeel newspaper, April 2008. 
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6.4. The Fragmented State Presence and Resistance  
Mapping out the brutality and uncertainty that characterize the behavior of the 
security apparatus in Egypt was also part of El Lemby’s subtext. The representatives of 
the apparatus are provoked, in a selective fashion, to arrest poor peddlers and impede the 
accomplishment of any simple dream of El Lemby. However, they never show up in the 
violent battles among residents with knives or in the drug smoking spaces. The apparatus 
was portrayed as part of the fragmented state that is not practicing violence towards its 
subjects to instate order and security. In contrast, the apparatus delivers a contradictory 
message that make of the absolute state control more of an elusive discourse deployed 
only to apply more violence and exclusion towards the disenfranchised.   
It is noticeable in El Lemby and Heen Maysara that the united construct of the 
state never exists, it is rather represented. The effect that the state agents produce on daily 
basis is the only proof on the existence of such power (detention, fabricated crimes, 
torture…). Timothy Mitchell209 studies ‘the state as effect’ and stresses the elusive 
character of the state’s existence. Joel S. Migdal210
“We should pay attention not only to the practices that produce the image of the 
state as an all powerful agent, but also to those that undermine this image. In this 
sense, I suggest that while certain rituals of state power bring citizens up to the 
state’s majesty others bring them around to see its broken nature. As such, I 
analyze the citizens’ encounters with the everyday state as rituals of power that 
bring the state down to the people and, in so doing, may occasion ridicule, 
contempt and derision”
 goes further when he suggests that 
some counterpractices and contradictory processes can destabilize this construct in a 
similar fashion. Ismail elaborates on this idea in relation to the Egyptian context: 
 
211
In my opinion, media representations are part of this process of deconstruction of 
the public gaze of the unitary construct of the state. On the one hand, they confer a 
specific significance (appreciation, apprehension, conviviality, etc…) in the dramatic 
. 
 
                                                     
209 . Mitchell, Timothy. 1989. Colonizing Egypt. Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press. 
210 . Migdal, Joel S. 2001. State in Society: Studying How States and Societies Constitute One Another. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
211 . Ismail, Salwa 2006. Political Life in Cairo’s New Quarters. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press. P.32 
 
107 
 
plots of daily micro-processes where subjects encounter state officials and administrators. 
Also, they expose the fragmentation of the mythical power of the state and propose 
different alternatives to the dominant script. Hence, the symbolic power of representation 
is the ability to challenge the hegemonic discourse and assimilating the minor 
counterpractices of the daily life into an awareness of the processes of control and 
dominance on the social activity exerted by the state. 
 However, we should not rush to conclude that this assimilation process that 
happens when viewers watch a film or a documentary empower their resistance 
strategies. We should even think about the contrary that such a representation may 
invoke, in my opinion, a temporary response like laughter or anger which may impede 
the conscious acts of resistance that may happen in reality. Mbembe contends: 
“The question of whether humor in the ‘postcolony’ is an expression of 
‘resistance’ or not, whether it is, a priori, opposition, or simply manifestation of 
hostility toward authority, is thus of secondary importance. For the most part, 
those who laugh are only reading the signs left, like rubbish, in the wake of the 
commandment.”212
Infusing the social imaginary with representations where the powerful state is 
fragmented and deconstructed may perpetuate the inability of the subordinates to resist. 
In my opinion Heen Maysara and El Lemby made of the repressive measures and 
grotesque control of the state over the daily minor practices of its subjects a naturalized 
fact of life. Representing the subjects in their everyday as working around the institutions 
of domination rather than questioning their brutality (like Hashisha) reproduces the 
imagery of the state as the ‘total cosmology’ that even the counterpractices (claimed by 
Migdal) occur under its umbrella. Fitting in the matrix of the corrupt ruler and engaging 
in survival strategies can hardly qualify as resistance, as Salwa Ismail states
 
 
6.5. Romanticizing subordination: We hate you… we’ll keep serving you 
 
 
213
From this perspective, it is hard to imagine through the representation of the 
police institution in both films that the uncertainty and shakiness of the state imagery is 
.  
                                                     
212 . Mbembe, Achille. 2001. “The Aesthetics of Vulgarity” In On the Postcolony. Berkeley: University of 
California Press. P. 108. 
213 . Ismail, Salwa. 2006. Political Life in Cairo’s New Quarters. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press. P. xxiii. 
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consistent and that the narratives of resistance embedded in the texts can become ‘true’. 
Finding a unifying logic for the performance of the state and the subordinates turns to be 
an unattainable endeavor. All the signs, signifiers and signifieds in these representations 
should be read versus a background of the ‘chaotically pluralistic’ space of their 
formation. According to Mbembe: 
“It is in practice impossible to create a single, permanently stable out of all the 
signs, images, and markers current in the postcolony; this is why they are 
constantly being shaped and reshaped, as much by the rulers as by the ruled, in 
attempts to rewrite the mythologies of power. This is why; too, the postcolony is, 
per excellence, a hollow pretense, a regime of unreality (regime du simulacra). By 
making it possible to play and have fun outside the limits set by officialdom, the 
very fact that the regime is a sham allows ordinary people to simulate adherence 
to the innumerable official rituals that life in the postcolony requires”214
“I would cut the hands that censor any scene in my movies or any other sort of 
artistic creativity product, the censorship apparatus had some logical remarks on 
the film, like when the officer falls on his knees to not create a problem with the 
police institution, then I agreed to write a thankful note on the final titer for the 
police because I do really appreciate their role and do not want the situation to 
become a chaos. Eventually, we resort to the police in situations of 
disorganization even if this institution oppresses and punishes its ‘sons’ when 
they exceed the limits…”
 
 
The finale of Heen Maysara makes a good example of the disturbed system of 
signifieds in the representation of the official institution and its incorporated subjects. 
The rebellious hero succeeds to challenge the institution in a very strong symbolic 
metaphor in the scene with the officer begging for his life and handling his gun (here 
symbolic of giving up control and a subversion of the power relations). There are even 
claims that the Ministry of Interior interfered to shorten this scene and remove the part 
where the officer falls on his knees, which Youssef interprets as follows: 
215
Youssef keeps sending contradictory messages about his challenge of the 
authorities, while positioning himself within its boundaries and hence admits the 
necessity of the deployment of oppression and violence selectively. Youssef says that we 
are the ‘sons’ of the security apparatus that engulfs the state and this father consequently 
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has the right to discipline its sons no matter what way he uses. In the final titer, Youssef 
did not only thank the apparatus that exploded the ashwaiyy district and its people one 
minute ago, but also put the following song imbued with metaphors of submissiveness 
disguised under the noble romantic love of homeland:  
 
We are the ones who protect her in hard times, 
And we are the forgotten in times of joy, 
When it sinks, only us who save her, 
And when it’s safe, we bent under its heaviness, 
We are the victims of love and duty, 
The eye will never be above the eyebrows, 
It is her love that inhabits our blood… 
 
The song romanticizes the subordination of the poor under slogans of patriotism 
(usually ‘her’ is interpreted as Egypt in many artistic metaphors). It sums up the message 
of Youssef: “the threat of ashwaiyyat can be overcome when the state/the father have 
some ‘intelligence’ to contain the repressed anger before it explodes.”216
                                                     
216 . Ibid, 2007. 
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Conclusion 
 I argue in this thesis that Heen Maysara and El Lemby provided me a tool to read 
how contemporary Egyptian middle class perceive their social reality. Gazing through the 
different parts of both films was rather similar to having a journey in the social imaginary 
of this class with all the nuances and diversity it holds. It was also part of examining the 
deep reasons behind shifts in the relationship, on the level of social discourse, between 
the poor classes and the well-off ones, a shift from tolerance and sympathy in the last 
decades to hostility and aggression in the 2000s. Considering myself a member of the 
middle class, I had the urge to further interrogate the violence, which I catch myself 
practicing sometimes, and which had become part and parcel of daily life in 
contemporary Egypt. And when I contemplated the arenas where this violence is most 
explicit and grotesque, I could not detach the state policies from the picture and I 
reviewed what appears like an implicit class conflict within a larger sociopolitical 
framework that invokes the most aggressive formulae of coexistence and social 
interaction between people in the Egyptian society. 
 I followed media productions that gradually pulled the causes of the poor and 
ashwaiyyat into the circle of light and adopted a well-determined discourse about finding 
solutions for them. I kept observing how this discourse took different forms starting from 
a populist political debate in talk shows and newspapers and rearticulated in both tragic 
and comic film treatments like Heen Maysara and El Lemby.  I found that in both films 
the construction of the character of the poor took it to the most extreme of views and 
imaginations. Regardless of whether the depiction was meant to ignite laughter or tears, 
both films presented being poor or living in ashwaiyyat as the most distorting and 
destructive living experience. In both films, the plots essentialized class position and 
location as the only perspective according to which the characters and their comportment 
could be judged. Consequently, a set of distinctive and class racist signs and signifieds 
were disguised behind a shallow moralistic justification always relying on poverty and 
dwelling in ashwaiyyat.  
111 
 
 Hence, I started to wonder whether this representation of the “catastrophe” of 
being poor or living in ashwaiyyat is exclusive to these groups of people or it is more of a 
mirror image of the anxiety of the middle class producers and consumers entangled in a 
complex predicament. The features of the predicament were also obvious in the media 
discourse that ran in parallel to defending the rights of the poor and talking about the 
horrors in ashwaiyyat. The themes of the shrinkage of middle class, the chaos infiltrating 
social institutions and the absence of the rule of law also dominated the social debate and 
the headlines of newspapers.    
I aimed at disclosing the nexus of relations embedded in these cinematic 
treatments where the characters from upper and lower classes are coercively situated in a 
chaotic context. At this nexus, the performance of the ruling regime and the sociopolitical 
history of the postcolonial state in Egypt were highlightened as cornerstone in the 
formation of the precarious moment Egyptians survive nowadays. I meant to refer to the 
backgrounds that reinforced the sense of absurdity and founded the social and political 
discourses that underpinned violence from the state against its citizens and paved the way 
for an absolute subordination of the state subjects from 1952 till now.  
Reviewing the films and the reactions of the audience I explored how processes of 
social exclusion and societal violence have been intimately related to the reality of 
deprivation from political freedoms and citizenship rights for successive decades (1952-
2008). I could also see as a more tangible fact the connection between creating an 
indigent and repressive political environment and distorting the very basic human 
features. In my opinion, El Lemby or Hashisha were not fundamentally lacking money or 
education, they rather lacked the conception of all relations and regulations through 
which money or education become valuable and functional tools for survival and social 
interaction. Reaching such a level of absurdity is an abstract representation not a complex 
realistic treatment; however, it looked like the easiest and effortless way to represent the 
reality of impunity that rendered the characters simultaneously powerless and careless in 
both films.   
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With an extremist representation of the poor, the producers of both movies 
targeted the middle class groups who face a serious existential challenge due to the re-
arrangement of their position in the contemporary economic and sociopolitical condition. 
And by stimulating a temporary shallow empathy, the targeted audience was guided to 
realize the impossibility of a safe coexistence with the marginalized disintegrated groups 
dwelling in ashwaiyyat.  Such empathy masked a deeper level of hostility that I tackled in 
my interviews and analysis. In different parts of this ethnography, I depicted the 
underlying disgust and aggression towards the poor on the part of audience, cultural elite, 
and critics of the Egyptian middle class.  
I also focused on how the producers of the middle class social imaginary in Egypt 
succeed in diverting and displacing the state/citizen relationship model to become 
applicable to the relation between upper and lower classes. In many situations in the films 
the storyline justified the brutal and grotesque interference of the police and state 
administrators in structuring the daily life of the poor dwellers of ashwaiyyat. 
Juxtaposing such interference to the utter dominance of the state security apparatus on the 
public life of the upper classes, we come to notice that it never made the hot topic of 
media productions or talk shows in the 2000s as ashwaiyyat and their hazardous impact 
on society did.  
I attempted to be impartial in presenting the diversified stances of the audience 
and critics of the films, especially with regard to their impressions about the 
representation of the poor. I highlighted the reactions of individuals from different 
positions expressing sometimes opposing points of view. However, I was obviously 
inclined to criticize and interrogate the “class racist” discourse that surged every now and 
then in my ethnography. My criticism was based on reviewing these racist tendencies and 
statements within the context of their construction and reinforcement. To achieve this, I 
interrogated the history of the postcolonial state in Egypt and linked this history to the 
academic literature about postcolonial state in Africa, which I consider a challenging 
argument in this text. 
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My contribution in this respect was essentially combining the academic 
frameworks that described the anomalous state/citizens relationship in Egypt as a Middle 
Eastern state particularity with those frameworks viewing it as one of the numerous 
drawbacks of the “coloniality” of power in Africa. Emphasizing this combination in my 
analytical framework, I presented my interpretation to the current sociopolitical 
conditions and the widely controversial discourse about “chaos” in Egypt. Hence, I tried 
to challenge the traditional categories that “interpretations of chaos” fall under and aimed 
at presenting a more complex picture of social agents in their encounters and negotiations 
of and with state power. 
Eventually, I aspire that future academic projects can build on this contribution in 
two principal ways. First, one contribution relates to the importance of reading widely 
consumed media representations in relationship to contemporary social reality, in an 
attempt to explore further the nexus between power and everyday life. The second 
contribution concerns the necessity of finding new and creative perspectives to interpret 
state/citizen relationships and dynamics in Egypt. The aim is to challenge traditional 
assumptions about the reasons behind stagnation and disorder. I presume that presenting 
an analysis of social reality in Egypt is greatly in need of an academic effort to unpack 
the complexity it encounters with the hope of understanding the challenging phenomena 
that is unfolding. 
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